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For those outside the world of deinstitutionalization and
disability rights, however, the Pennhurst case carries different
associations, drawn from the two Supreme Court decisions (in 1981
and 1984) that the litigation produced. Although rarely analyzed in
tandem, both decisions were about the scope of federal power vis-àvis the states: the first about how to interpret the terms of federal-state
grants-in-aid, a ubiquitous policy device by the second half of the
twentieth century; the second about state sovereign immunity.
Bringing these multiple legacies together for the first time—with
the benefit of interviews and archival research—this Article shows
how an unprecedented victory for disabled and institutionalized
Americans limited the role of the federal government in the lives of all
Americans. The litigation did so by (1) restricting Congress’s ability
to incentivize fair and adequate treatment and (2) constraining
individuals’ use of federal courts to hold accountable the level of
government with the most meaningful ability to harm or help them.
This Article concludes by suggesting what we gain from restoring
historical context to these doctrinal innovations. Future research
should explore how ideas about intellectual and developmental
disability in the late twentieth century informed equality doctrines and
the judicial enforcement of positive rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty miles outside of Philadelphia sit the ruins of the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital. From its founding in 1908 until its closing in 1987, the
institution housed more than ten thousand people whom the state considered
unsuited to life in the community, often because of intellectual or developmental
impairment.1 Today, part of the 110-acre property functions as a “haunted
asylum,” capitalizing in complex ways on the real horror that some residents
experienced there.2 Another part of the property hosts a food waste disposal
operation. Plans are in the works for a business park.3
As Pennhurst’s physical imprint on the land fades, its legal legacy endures
and grows. By 1974, the neglect and brutality that residents experienced in this
large, state-run facility had become the basis for one of the most important uses
of affirmative litigation in the nation’s history: Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School and Hospital. Through what law professor Owen Fiss famously dubbed
a “structural injunction” (i.e., one that “alter[s] or reorganiz[es] some
institutional arrangement”),4 the lawsuit led eventually to Pennhurst’s closure.
In doing so, it also produced important pronouncements about the status of
people whose bodies and minds functioned differently from the norm.5 Along
1. Dennis B. Downey, The Idea of Pennhurst: Eugenics and the Abandonment of Hope, in
PENNHURST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS 17, 30 (Dennis B. Downey & James W.
Conroy eds., 2020). The institution’s original name was the Eastern Pennsylvania State Institution for
the Feeble-minded and Epileptic. Dennis B. Downey & James W. Conroy, Introduction to PENNHURST
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra, at 1.
2. Jamie Tarabay, Haunted House Has Painful Past as Asylum, NPR (Oct. 29, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130840594 [https://perma.cc/N88J-SH3L]; see
Pennhurst
Haunted
Asylum,
PENNHURST
ASYLUM,
https://pennhurstasylum.com/
[https://perma.cc/4B3E-3B9Y]. On the complexity of the haunted asylum attraction, including
managers’ and employees’ personal connections to disability, see Nathan R. Stenberg, Honoring a
House of Horrors: Community, Commemoration, and the Specter of Institutionalization at the
Pennhurst Asylum (forthcoming) (on file with author).
3. See Jacob Adelman, Notorious Pennhurst Hospital Campus Gets Pa. Grant Toward Rebirth
as
Business
Park,
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Nov.
21,
2017),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/real_estate/commercial/notorious-pennhurst-hospitalcampus-gets-pa-grant-toward-rebirth-as-business-park-20171121.html
[https://perma.cc/V22VWKNC]. There is also a dedicated campaign to preserve Pennhurst and the stories of those who resided
there. See Nathaniel Guest, Preservation: A Case Study of Collective Conscience, in PENNHURST AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 195, 198.
4. OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 1 (1972).
5. Drawing on insights from Critical Disability Studies, I try to use terms that the individuals I
write about would claim for themselves. When I do not know an individual’s preference but I think
disability is relevant, I try to convey that person’s disability/disabilities with specificity and to base my
description on reliable sources. When referring to the broad category of people who live(d) with some
kind of physical or mental impairment, I tend to use the identity-first term “disabled people,” as is
currently common among scholars, writers, and advocates who identify as disabled. When referring to
a sub-category of that group, however, such as people with intellectual disabilities, I tend to use the
people-first framing, because I think the norm is less clear. See generally Disability Language Style
Guide, NAT’L CTR. ON DISABILITY & JOURNALISM (Aug. 2021), https://ncdj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/NCDJ-STYLE-GUIDE-EDIT-2021-SILVERMAN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PVH8-HGCR] (declining to recommend “person-first” language as a universal default
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with similar lawsuits in other jurisdictions, the Pennhurst case helped make
institutionalization seem legally and morally suspect.6 The 1977 trial court
decision retains a vital place in U.S. disability history7 and has become an
important precedent in the growing movement for decarceration.8
On appeal, the Halderman v. Pennhurst case also produced two farreaching pronouncements from the U.S. Supreme Court. Both were about the
relationship between the states and the federal government, although the two
opinions are rarely analyzed in tandem. The first of these Supreme Court
decisions, in 1981, birthed an important new rule for interpreting federal-state
grants-in-aid: the “clear-statement rule.”9 In practice, that rule curbs the federal
government’s ability to influence the states via its superior financial resources—
which by the late twentieth century had become an entrenched mode of exerting
national authority and vindicating civil rights.10 A second Supreme Court
decision in 1984 significantly reinterpreted the Eleventh Amendment and
thereafter prevented state law claims against state officials from proceeding in
federal court.11 Subsequent decisions built on this foundation, giving more and

but encouraging writers to consider such language when referring to someone with an intellectual
disability).
6. For a succinct overview of this 1960s–1970s wave of deinstitutionalization litigation, see
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(2012); see also Laura I. Appleman, Deviancy, Dependency, and Disability: The Forgetting History of
Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68 DUKE L.J. 417, 454–58 (2018) (discussing efforts by the mental
health bar to make visible the “involuntary incarceration” of people with disabilities and to frame their
experiences in terms of civil rights).
7. See, e.g., PENNHURST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1.
8. See LIAT BEN-MOSHE, DECARCERATING DISABILITY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
PRISON ABOLITION 236, 238 (2020) (describing Pennhurst as “[t]he most remarkable case in the history
of decarceration litigation” and noting its unique focus on abolition as opposed to reform).
9. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1 (1981); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619 (1992) (seeing in Pennhurst I the beginning of “the Court’s
New Super-Strong Clear Statement Rules”); Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court
and the Clear Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2010)
(seeing the same in Pennhurst I). For an elaboration on the larger universe of clear statement rules that
the Court has articulated, see John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 399 (2010).
10. See MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN
MASSACHUSETTS (1970) (demonstrating the importance of federal-state grants-in-aid to social welfare
policy); KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE: CONGRESS AND THE NEW
FEDERALISM, 1877-1929 (2007) (documenting the expansion of national authority that occurred via
grants-in-aid); Joy Milligan, Remembering: The Constitution and Federally Funded Apartheid, 89 U.
CHI. L. REV. 65, 73 (2022) (describing the suite of “Spending Clause civil rights statutes” that was in
place by the late twentieth century).
11. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
Previous decisions expressed no concern with this practice, so long as there was a valid federal law claim
arising from the same underlying facts.
Practically speaking, this doctrinal change affected not only state claims but also federal
claims because of the strategic value in pursuing federal and state claims in the same action. After this
decision, plaintiffs with both types of claims had an incentive to pursue federal claims in state court and
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more heft to the state sovereign immunity principle that the Pennhurst decision
emphasized.12
Taken together, these two Supreme Court decisions helped cabin some of
the expansive possibilities that the post-Civil War Constitution made available
and that the “Second Reconstruction” enlivened (with help from what political
scientist Sean Farhang calls the “litigation state”).13 Other decisions during this
period famously moderated Black Americans’ claims for equality,14 but the
Court’s decisions in Halderman v. Pennhurst had a more sweeping, transsubstantive effect, by forcing federal courts into a role that was at once more
assertive and more modest. The decisions impelled courts to become more
assertive in their oversight of Congress, which critics perceived as making
extravagant equality guarantees without pausing to count the costs.15 The
Pennhurst decisions impelled modesty in the courts’ dealings with state
governments, particularly when it came to enforcing rights in ways that spent
and allocated state resources. Cases that built on the Pennhurst decisions would
further constrain Congress—most recently and significantly in its ability to make
government-funded healthcare broadly available to low-income Americans.16
In short, the Pennhurst decisions heralded the arrival of a “new federalism”:
a sea change in how a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court, led by
President Nixon’s appointees, envisioned the proper relationship between the
federal government and the states. That vision was in tension with a technique
of governance—federal grants-in-aid—that began as an alternative to more
robust uses of federal power but that could seem overly intrusive, especially once
it became bound up with civil rights enforcement. The Supreme Court’s “new

to give up the federal forum. See Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The
Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 658–59 (1985).
12. See infra Part III.B, Insulating the States from Accountability.
13. The “Second Reconstruction” refers to historic mid-twentieth century efforts by all three
branches of the federal government to end the racialized caste system that the First Reconstruction
targeted. See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
AND BEYOND IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-2006 (3d ed. 2007). For further discussion on the “litigation
state,” see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN
THE U.S. (2010).
14. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In other cases from this era, the Court did not accept invitations
to narrow Black Americans’ equality claims. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1982).
15. Judith Resnik’s work on the Rehnquist Court has captured the assertiveness I am trying to
convey. She described how pronouncements about the federal courts’ need for restraint vis-à-vis states
coincided with the Supreme Court’s own lack of restraint vis-à-vis Congress’s efforts to create and
protect rights. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003).
16. I refer here to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the Act’s Medicaid expansion provision. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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federalism” placed greater restrictions on the federal government and left it with
a smaller toolkit for shaping the content of social and economic citizenship.17
To be clear, Pennhurst was not a “but for” cause of these broad doctrinal
shifts. It did, however, seem to be a convenient vehicle. The kind of people who
benefited from the Pennhurst litigation—people with often severe intellectual
and developmental disabilities—sparked pity in the broader public, but they were
not the promise-filled schoolchildren of Brown v. Board of Education.18 The
state and local defendants in Pennhurst were clearly implicated in an unjust,
dysfunctional system, but no one cast them as bigoted obstructionists. And the
issue at the heart of Pennhurst went well beyond segregation and exclusion. It
was about the nature of the government’s obligation to people who were
traditionally understood as, at best, objects of charity, and, at worst, dangers to
society.19 Amid narratives of overburdened states and scarce resources, the
climate was ripe for limiting the equality rights of certain categories of disabled
citizens, and through them, the broader American public.
The Pennhurst plaintiffs and their lawyers did not forecast this
development and could not have been expected to. For years, reformers had tried
to remediate the inhumane conditions at Pennhurst. Federal court litigation
seemed like the only avenue left. In this, they were similar to formerly enslaved
persons and their descendants, who recognized their vulnerability in state and
local fora and turned to federal courts to vindicate their rights.20 This was one of
the central promises of Reconstruction, and in 1974, it still seemed viable. In
17. When legal scholars think about this “new federalism,” they often invoke landmark
decisions interpreting the Tenth Amendment (e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, (1992);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)), the Commerce Clause (e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995)), and the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004). I am
making the case for giving the Pennhurst litigation a more prominent place in this story. Joining scholars
such as Louise Weinberg and Logan Sawyer III, I am also inviting scholars to see the “new federalism”
earlier, well before the 1990s. Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191,
1195–96 (1977); Logan Everett Sawyer III, The Return of Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENV. U.L.
REV. 221, 221 (2014).
18. This is a statement about how the public tended to perceive the Pennhurst plaintiffs, not
about their actual promise or potential. In recent decades, with the rise of the self-advocacy movement,
former residents have made clear how stifled their growth was at Pennhurst and how much they had to
contribute to the wider community. See, e.g., Glenn Rifkin, Overlooked No More: Roland Johnson, Who
Fought to Shut Down Institutions for the Disabled, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/obituaries/roland-johnson-overlooked.html
[https://perma.cc/GHL3-FTLT]; Interview by Lisa Sonneborn with Tom Delmastro, Visionary Voices:
Tom Delmastro Ch 7, TEMP. UNIV. INST. ON DISABILITIES (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://disabilities.temple.edu/voices/interviews/delmastro-chapter-7 [https://perma.cc/8ZR8-8MJ9];
Mark Friedman & Nancy K. Nowell, The Rise of Self-Advocacy: A Personal Remembrance, in
PENNHURST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 124.
19. See Appleman, supra note 6.
20. Some members of the Pennhurst class were Black, and I want to be careful not to implicitly
code all disabled people as White or non-raced (or to code Black people as non-disabled). In litigation,
however, the plaintiffs’ lawyers did not emphasize their clients’ races. To the extent race came up, it
was as an analogy to disability.

2022]

THE PENNHURST DOCTRINES

1163

availing themselves of this option, however, the Pennhurst plaintiffs
inadvertently occasioned its diminishment.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reconstructs the circumstances that
prompted the Pennhurst litigation, emphasizing years of failed efforts to achieve
an adequate state response. This context helps explain why the Pennhurst
plaintiffs ended up in federal court and underscores why federal government
authority mattered to disabled and institutionalized Americans. This Section also
describes the trial court decision, which the disability rights movement and its
allies greeted with excitement but which generated concern among some state
officials. Part II summarizes the important turns that the case took on appeal, as
it stood in for larger concerns about burdened states, unrealistic federal
congressional mandates, and activist federal judges. Part III analyzes the
doctrinal legacies of the Pennhurst litigation, with an emphasis on what we gain
by viewing the two Supreme Court decisions as a pair rather than in isolation.
This Section shows how principles that the Supreme Court articulated in
Pennhurst limited what Americans are now entitled to expect from government
and the remedies they may seek.
Part IV is a provocation, inspired by the burgeoning field of disability legal
studies21 and by legal scholars who have shown the value of restoring historical
context to legal principles we often take for granted.22 Instead of de-coupling
doctrine from its original context, as lawyers so often do, what if we re-coupled
it, and underscored disability? This Section emphasizes tropes that are familiar
to the disability community and that appear in the Supreme Court’s engagement
with Pennhurst, such as the notions that inclusion of people with disabilities is
too costly, in light of their supposedly limited value to society. This Section also
takes note of other Supreme Court cases from the same era involving
intellectually or developmentally disabled litigants—e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center—and in which the result was a retreat from expansive, federally
backed guarantees of protection and inclusion.
I.
THE ROAD TO HALDERMAN V. PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL
In 1974, a young lawyer named David Ferleger filed a federal lawsuit in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of Pennhurst resident Terri Lee

21. On disability legal studies, see the excellent overview in Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman,
Disability, Law, and the Humanities: The Rise of Disability Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LAW & THE HUMANITIES 145, 152 (Simon Stern, Maksymilian Del Mar & Bernadette Meyler eds.,
2020) (“Looking at the legal system through a disability studies lens exposes biases and stereotypes that
are deeply embedded into the law.”). See also Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got
to Do with It or an Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 403–
04 (2011) (“[T]here is a ‘disability angle’ to every aspect of the law”).
22. See, e.g., Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79 (2020); Maggie Blackhawk,
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2019); Shirin Sinnar,
The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379 (2017).
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Halderman, individually and on behalf of similarly situated residents.23 The
complaint charged Pennhurst, the State Department of Public Welfare, and
various state employees with neglectful and abusive conduct, ranging from the
overuse of restraints and sedatives, to intentional acts of violence, to the use of
dehumanizing practices for meeting residents’ toileting and feeding needs.
Halderman’s records alone suggested over forty injury-causing incidents
between March 1966 and November 1973. On one occasion, when Halderman
fractured her jaw, Pennhurst employees were so inattentive that, after finally
noticing something amiss, they mistook a dangling piece of jaw for a loose tooth
and pulled it out.24 Other alleged injuries were less violent but no less tragic,
including Halderman’s loss of the handful of words she brought with her into
Pennhurst. Upon admission, she only regressed. The complaint charged the
defendants with numerous federal and state law violations, including of the
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to adequate treatment.25
Ferleger was one of a crop of recent law school graduates (he received his
JD in 1972) who were concerned about the treatment of people whom society
labeled “insane” and “mentally ill.”26 This was the era when psychiatrist Thomas
Szasz famously questioned diagnoses of mental illness, casting them as
disguised efforts to maintain social order.27 Around the same time, physicianlawyer Morton Birnbaum advocated for a “right to treatment” in institutional

23. First Amended Complaint, Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (No. 74-1345).
24. Id. at 14. Pulling out teeth, without administering pain relief, was reportedly routine at
Pennhurst; it was an easy way to stop children from biting. James W. Conroy & Dennis B. Downey,
The Veil of Secrecy: A Legacy of Exploitation and Abuse, in PENNHURST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 58, 70.
25. First Amended Complaint, supra note 23, at 25–28. An excellent secondary source on the
litigation written with access to key actors is Robert H. Mnookin’s In the Interest of Children (1985).
Robert “Bo” Burt, the author of the three chapters on Pennhurst, graduated from Yale alongside Tom
Gilhool, one of the main lawyers in the Pennhurst litigation. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST
OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 292 (1985). Burt was also Gilhool’s
classmate in a transformational seminar on law, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. Interviews by Fred
Pelka with Thomas K. Gilhool, Legal Advocate for Deinstitutionalization and the Right to Education
for People with Developmental Disabilities, REG’L ORAL HIST. OFF., BANCROFT LIBR., UNIV. OF CAL.,
BERKELEY
51–52
(2010)
[hereinafter
Gilhool,
UC
BERKELEY],
https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/gilhool_thomas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5YVNRUS].
26. I acknowledge how derogatory and insensitive some of these terms now sound. Neither I
nor the California Law Review wish to perpetuate them. My intention in using them is to show, with
specificity, what David Ferleger and other lawyers in his cohort were concerned about. In their own
time, these lawyers recognized such labels as harmful and unfairly stigmatizing.
27. See THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961); Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: 50 Years Later, 35
PSYCHIATRIST 179, 179 (2011) (“I proposed that we view the phenomena formerly called ‘psychoses’
and ‘neuroses’, now simply called ‘mental illnesses’, as behaviours that disturb or disorient others or the
self; reject the image of the patients as the helpless victims of pathobiological events outside their
control; and withdraw from participating in coercive psychiatric practices as incompatible with the
foundational moral ideals of free societies.”).
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settings.28 Inspired, Ferleger and his cohort brought a wave of cases to the federal
courts on behalf of people who had ended up in institutions solely because of
their apparently non-normative mental functioning.29 These lawyers also offered
bold ideas about judicial remedies, borrowing from the desegregation cases that
figured so prominently in their young lives and building on the Warren Court’s
more activist approach toward protecting rights.30 Halderman v. Pennhurst was
part of this first wave of litigation.
But to understand why the conditions at Pennhurst, a state institution,
became the subject of federal court litigation, we must begin much earlier, in the
1950s.31 Building on local newspaper accounts, interviews, original archival
research, and other first-person accounts of life in and around Pennhurst, this
Section traces decades of efforts to improve the institution and explains why
these efforts culminated in a landmark trial and injunction. The point here is not
to blame any particular set of actors for Pennhurst’s failings, but to restore lost
context to a remedial decree that conservative members of the Supreme Court
would later characterize as extreme—so extreme as to occasion a new rule of
statutory interpretation and a new interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.
A. “Hell” Behind a “Boarding School Look”: Pennhurst’s Steady
Decline
The decade after World War Two was in many ways a golden age for
institutions like Pennhurst. Earlier in the twentieth century, institutions for
people with disabilities manifested eugenic thinking: they kept “defective”
people away from the general population and thereby helped keep the White race
strong and pure.32 By the mid-twentieth century, these same institutions had a
different cast. The eugenic logic, though still an animating force, became less

28. Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 499, 499 (1960).
29. Others in this cohort included Bruce Ennis, Paul Friedman, Thomas Gilhool (discussed
supra note 25), Steve Gold, Charles Halpern, and Gabe Kaimowitz. Halpern captured the general milieu
in his book MAKING WAVES AND RIDING THE CURRENTS: ACTIVISM AND THE PRACTICE OF WISDOM
(2008).
30. Early landmark cases include Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Later desegregation cases showcased more aggressive uses of federal judicial power, as federal judges
rejected inadequate schemes for implementing Brown and instead ordered busing and other forms of
equitable relief. See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
31. This choice of starting point is not meant to suggest a lack of earlier abuses, only that
developments in the post-World War Two period exposed Pennhurst to a new degree of scrutiny.
32. There is an extensive literature on eugenic thinking and the institutionalization of people
who appeared (or could be cast as) non-normative in their functioning or appearance. For a useful
overview, see Michael Rembis, Disability and the History of Eugenics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
DISABILITY HISTORY 85 (Michael Rembis, Catherine Kudlick & Kim E. Nielsen eds., 2018); see also
Appleman, supra note 6, at 436–61 (recounting the longstanding role of eugenic thinking in the
treatment of disabled people in the United States and the direct connection to mass incarceration). On
Pennhurst’s connection to eugenics, see Downey, supra note 1, at 30–33.
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blatant. Proponents of institutionalization instead tended to emphasize families:
by providing humane and professional care, the argument went, institutions
allowed families to focus on maintaining the healthy and productive households
that were the cornerstone of post-World War Two society. Celebrities such as
author Pearl S. Buck wrote openly, in sympathetic “confessional” style, about
institutionalizing beloved children.33 Waiting lists for institutions were long, and
construction of new facilities tracked demand.34 Between 1946 and 1967, the
number of people with intellectual disabilities living in institutions increased by
65 percent (twice the growth rate of the general population).35
There were nonetheless signs that all was not right at Pennhurst. In 1952,
twenty-nine-year-old Pennhurst resident Robert Beyers reportedly died of a heart
attack, but his family found cuts and bruises all over his body.36 Combined with
Beyers’s race (he was African American) and his parents’ outrage, the injuries
triggered an FBI investigation.37 The next year brought a months-long, schoolwide quarantine at Pennhurst in response to the rampant spread of hepatitis. The
virus infected 425 people before the institution contained it.38 In 1957, after
Pennhurst failed to inoculate patients against the flu, an epidemic killed twenty
and infected hundreds more.39 Scholars would later connect these outbreaks to
Pennhurst’s history as an experimental research site for vaccine development and
infectious epidemiology: with the support of federal and corporate grants,
researchers injected hundreds of Pennhurst residents with live viruses during and
after World War Two.40 Even before this came to light, however, journalists were
alert to other indications of residents’ devaluation, including overcrowding,
insufficient staffing, decaying facilities, and lack of resources for basic operating
33. Michael Grossberg, From Feeble-Minded to Mentally Retarded: Child Protection and the
Changing Place of Disabled Children in the Mid-Twentieth Century United States, 47 PAEDOGOGICA
HISTORICA 729, 729–30, 739 (2011).
34. JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 240–41 (2017). This is not to say that there was no skepticism about
institutional living. According to Trent, “[e]xposés of public facilities for mentally ill and mentally
deficient people appeared often after World War II,” driven in part by conscientious objectors who
labored in these facilities during the war and were disturbed by what they saw there. Id. at 220. But in
the public’s mind, these competed with narratives that framed institutionalization as doctor
recommended and essential for the health and well-being of the disabled person’s family. Id. at 222–28.
35. Id. at 241.
36. State Orders Probe into Death of Patient at Pennhurst School, MERCURY (Pottstown), Nov.
19, 1952, at 9.
37. Fine Raises State Rights Issue over Probe of Dead Boy, PHILA. TRIB., Aug. 8, 1953. The
investigation, which reportedly focused on whether Beyers’s civil rights had been violated, prompted a
sharp rebuke from Pennsylvania Governor John Fine. Fine warned that such investigations would invite
thousands more, hampering the state’s ability to run its prisons and other institutions of confinement. Id.
38. See Quarantine to End at Pennhurst School, MERCURY (Pottstown), July 22, 1953, at 11.
39. Steve McNey, Flu Kills Five at Pennhurst, MERCURY (Pottstown), Oct. 16, 1957, at 1; Flu
at Pennhurst Takes 20th Life, MERCURY (Pottstown), Oct. 29, 1957, at 1.
40. Conroy & Downey, supra note 24, at 64–68. Pennhurst was not the only such site. See
Walter M. Robinson & Brandon T. Unruh, The Hepatitis Experiments at Willowbrook State School, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 80, 80 (Ezekiel J. Emanual et al. eds., 2008)
(describing infectious disease studies conducted at Willowbrook State School).
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needs.41 The campus itself remained “picturesque”—“one of wide green lawn
expanses” and “curling lanes and driveways,” according to the local newspaper,
the Pottstown Mercury.42 But insiders hinted of “disgraceful and disgusting
conditions” within.43
National trends suggest that Pennhurst was likely getting worse, in ways
that could not long be hidden away. Institutionalized populations had
increased—Pennhurst’s on-site residential population reached a high of nearly
3,500 in 195544—but states were not necessarily prepared to maintain them.45
Simultaneously, institutions had become more expensive to operate, an
unintended consequence of the nation’s obsession with “juvenile delinquency.”
In previous decades, state and local governments had funneled “delinquent”
adolescents into institutions, alongside other supposedly “defective” individuals;
there, the nondisabled “delinquents” provided unpaid labor.46 In the late 1950s
and early 1960s, as policymakers developed specialized facilities for “juvenile
delinquents,” institutions like Pennhurst lost a significant segment of their
workforce. Simultaneously, they absorbed new residents, most of whom had
greater needs and less capacity to work than the people they replaced.47
As conditions at Pennhurst and similar institutions declined, some members
of the public grew more vigilant. This had something to do with the shifting class
composition of institutions: by the early 1960s, wealthier and more-resourced
families had relatives there.48 Relatedly, parents of children with developmental
and intellectual disabilities had formed networks for support and advocacy. One
41. See Steve McNey, Pennhurst Board Sends List of Needs to State, MERCURY (Pottstown),
July 25, 1957, at 1, 11; Transfer of Pennhurst “Crib Cases” Cut by Appropriations, MERCURY
(Pottstown), Aug. 2, 1957, at 1; Pennhurst Forced to Cut Staff, MERCURY (Pottstown), Jan. 16, 1958,
at 1.
42. Gordon P. Griffiths, Pennhurst Opens Doors for Complete Check, MERCURY (Pottstown),
Sept. 22, 1962, at 8; see also Interviews by Fred Pelka with Thomas K. Gilhool, supra note 25, at 19
(describing Pennhurst in the 1960s as resembling a “college campus”).
43. Favoritism Charged in Pennhurst Hassle, MERCURY (Pottstown), Apr. 7, 1962, at 1; see
also Gordon B. Griffiths, Pennhurst Professional Employes [sic] Charge Lack of Health Protection,
MERCURY (Pottstown), Sept. 19, 1962, at 1 (detailing unsanitary conditions at Pennhurst).
44. J. Gregory Pirmann, Living in a World Apart, in PENNHURST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 39, 50. The “on-book census” recorded even higher numbers
because it included the residents of two affiliated facilities elsewhere in the state (the “Pennhurst
Annexes”). Id.
45. See TRENT, supra note 34, at 241 (describing state legislators’ dawning recognition of the
“drain on state budgets”).
46. Id.
47. Id.; ANNE E. PARSONS, FROM ASYLUM TO PRISON: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE
RISE OF MASS INCARCERATION AFTER 1945, at 62–65 (2018). On Pennhurst’s use of unpaid resident
labor, see Pirmann, supra note 44, at 46–48; see also Interview by Lisa Sonneborn with Tom Delmastro,
Visionary Voices: Tom Delmastro Ch 4, TEMP. UNIV. INST. ON DISABILITIES (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://disabilities.temple.edu/voices/interviews/delmastro-chapter-4 [https://perma.cc/R5PB-JKTE]
(recalling that he was not paid for the labor he did at Pennhurst, except for when he was working in the
“workshop”).
48. See Grossberg, supra note 33, at 742 (attributing the rise of parent organizing to the fact that
institutions were “suddenly being filled with the sons and daughters of the more prosperous classes”).
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influential parents’ group—the National Association for Retarded Children
(NARC)49—had 550 chapters by 1958. Among the group’s concerns was the
quality of residential institutions.50 And behind all of these efforts was the
glamorous glow of the Kennedys, America’s first family. In 1962, the Kennedys
disclosed a family secret: that President John F. Kennedy’s oldest sister, Rose
Marie (“Rosemary”) Kennedy, had been born with an intellectual disability;
eventually, the family placed her in a private institution.51 Through federal policy
and their family foundation, the Kennedys encouraged Americans to
acknowledge the existence of disability and to want more for their disabled
children.52
By 1965, Pennhurst was regularly making the headlines of the local
newspaper, often not in a good way. In January of that year, the Mercury noted
a plea from Pennhurst’s superintendent for more state resources, to respond to
severe overcrowding and understaffing.53 On at least three separate occasions
between January and July, the Mercury highlighted unusual patient deaths (one
in a snow-plowing accident, a second by strangulation, and a third by
drowning).54 And in the fall of 1965, shortly after Senator Robert Kennedy drew
national attention for his exposure of horrific institutional conditions in New
York State,55 the Mercury launched a broader investigation into Pennhurst. The
resulting series proclaimed Pennhurst “a living nightmare,” an “overcrowded
dumping ground,” “hell” behind a “boarding school look,” and a place of
“desolation” and “despair.” “Empty lives just exist day to day” here, reported the
paper, some “little elevated from the vegetable state of existence.”56
49. At the time of the organization’s founding, medical professionals, government officials, and
the general public routinely used the term “retarded” to describe people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities. This term is now considered derogatory and offensive. NARC eventually
renamed itself the Arc in recognition of the term’s pejorative connotations.
50. See TRENT, supra note 34, at 231; Alison C. Carey & Lucy Gu, Walking the Line Between
the Past and the Future: Parents’ Resistance and Commitment to Institutionalization, in DISABILITY
INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 101, 105 (Liat
Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman & Allison C. Carey eds., 2014).
51. Eunice Kennedy Shriver, Hope for Retarded Children, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept.
22, 1962, at 71–72. Left out of this initial disclosure was the family patriarch’s role in worsening
Rosemary’s condition by having her undergo a prefrontal lobotomy. TRENT, supra note 34, at 238.
52. See generally EDWARD SHORTER, THE KENNEDY FAMILY AND THE STORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION (2000) (describing the Kennedy family’s interest in disability and the way this interest
affected family members’ charitable and political work).
53. Pennhurst Shows Need for Aid Plea, MERCURY (Pottstown), Jan. 30, 1965, at 1.
54. Truck Kills Patient at Pennhurst, MERCURY (Pottstown), Jan. 12, 1965, at 16; Police
Checking Death of Patient at Pennhurst, MERCURY (Pottstown), May 17, 1965, at 27; Pennhurst Patient
Is Found Dead, MERCURY (Pottstown), July 1, 1965, at 1.
55. In his testimony before the Joint Legislative Committee on Mental Retardation and Physical
Handicap, Kennedy famously characterized New York’s Willowbrook State School and Rome State
School as “snake pits.” Robert Kennedy Visiting Institutions in NY, MINN. DEP’T OF ADMIN.:
PARALLELS
IN
TIME,
https://mn.gov/mnddc/parallels/five/5b/bobby-kennedy-snakepits.html
[https://perma.cc/3ZG8-HHVF].
56. Andrew D. Cook, Dirty, Naked Men and Women Seethe in Turmoil of Clouded Minds,
MERCURY (Pottstown), Oct. 21, 1965, at 7; Andrew D. Cook, An Overcrowded Dumping Ground for
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The Mercury relied on grotesque descriptions of physical difference to
draw readers into this “nightmare,” raising questions about journalists’ ability to
empathize with residents, but the paper did shine a spotlight on Pennhurst’s
dehumanizing, warehouse-like conditions.57 A photo showed a group of White,
male residents, all with the same close-cropped haircut, packed together on
benches in an otherwise barren room; they were naked, according to the caption
(the backs of the benches obscured most of their bodies from view), and doing
nothing other than “waiting to return to bed.”58 Another photo depicted a few of
the many “grown men” at Pennhurst who “spen[t] [their] [l]ives in [c]ribs.”59
The photo caption described that particular ward as “[f]illed with the putrid odor
of human waste and the screams and moans of senseless men.”60
The Mercury aimed its fire at the public, for its irrational fear of people
with developmental and intellectual disabilities, and at elected representatives,
for failing to allocate adequate resources to Pennhurst.61 “It is almost purely a
financial problem,” the Mercury editorialized.62 The facility needed more and
better-qualified workers, and the state had not supplied the funds.63 Perhaps this
was why, in the crib photo cited above, the Mercury photographer made sure to
include state legislator Edwin Holl looking on, alongside superintendent Dr.
Leopold Potkonski.64 The Mercury also took the unusual step of reprinting
“special brochure editions” of its Pennhurst exposés and distributing them to
state lawmakers.65
Initially, the Mercury series did provoke a response. Mere weeks after the
stories broke, the Mercury reported a bipartisan effort to secure institutional
improvements and better employee pay.66 By January 1966, State Secretary of
Welfare Arlin M. Adams had named a “blue ribbon panel” to investigate and the

3182 Retarded; Pennhurst ‘Hell’ Is Hidden by Boarding School Look, MERCURY (Pottstown), Oct. 22,
1965, at 1; Andrew D. Cook, Public’s ‘Don’t Care’ Attitude Mirrored by Desolation, Despair of
Retarded, MERCURY (Pottstown), Oct. 23, 1965, at 1; Andrew D. Cook, Retarded Can Be Helped by
State Doctor’s Plan, MERCURY (Pottstown), Oct. 25, 1965.
57. See Cook, Dirty, Naked Men, supra note 56.
58. Cook, An Overcrowded Dumping Ground, supra note 56.
59. Cook, Public’s ‘Don’t Care’ Attitude, supra note 56.
60. Id. The men depicted in this photo also appear to be White. This bears noting because a
substantial percentage of Pennhurst’s residents at that time were non-White. In 1968, the Philadelphia
Tribune described the “patient population” as 25 percent Black. Arlene Urges More Pay for Pennhurst
Workers, PHILA. TRIB., July 27, 1968, at 3. Perhaps Mercury editors hoped White residents would be
more sympathetic and more likely to spark legislative interest.
61. See Cook, Public’s ‘Don’t Care’ Attitude, supra note 56.
62. Cook, An Overcrowded Dumping Ground, supra note 56.
63. Id.
64. See Cook, Public’s ‘Don’t Care’ Attitude, supra note 56.
65. $5 Million Total May Be Spent at State School, MERCURY (Pottstown), Jan. 4, 1966, at 9.
66. State Considers New Hospital for Retarded, MERCURY (Pottstown), Nov. 18, 1965, at 1;
Bipartisan Effort Gains in State for Pennhurst, MERCURY (Pottstown), Nov. 29, 1965, at 1.
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legislature had authorized an emergency appropriation of $1 million ($8.68
million in 2022 dollars) to address deficiencies at the facility.67
The hopeful news continued over the following months. In February 1966,
Pennhurst received a modest increase in its annual appropriation, as well as a
commitment from the state to shift one hundred of its most “serious cases” into
“private nursing homes.”68 And that fall, the state legislature enacted the Mental
Health Mental Retardation Act, which articulated the State’s duty to make
available “adequate . . . services” to people whose mental health, intellectual
disability, or developmental disability created service needs.69 The Mercury
celebrated. A “crusade” that “had been going on around here for years” finally
seemed to be achieving results.70
B. The Inadequacy of State and Local Advocacy
If state officials were sincere in their desire to improve Pennhurst, their
efforts were also tragically inadequate. Some evidence of this emerged in the
summer of 1968 as disgruntled employees, themselves stressed by Pennhurst’s
inadequacies, rebutted the notion that residents were content. “Mice and
cockroaches crawl over the patients,” reported a group of employees seeking to
unionize.71
The organization that did the most to show this inadequacy, however, was
the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC),72 a well-connected
and resourceful state-level chapter of NARC. One PARC member, in particular,
was a great energizing force: lawyer Dennis Haggerty, chairperson of PARC’s
Residential Care Committee. Having seen how poorly a state-run institution
treated his own son, Haggerty threw himself into investigating and exposing
Pennhurst and its ilk.73

67. See State Pushes $1 Million for Pennhurst, MERCURY (Pottstown), Jan. 4, 1966, at 1; Blue
Ribbon Panel Named to Investigate Pennhurst, MERCURY (Pottstown), Jan. 5, 1966, at 1. Adams would
go on to become a judge on the Third Circuit, where he would continue to encounter Pennhurst’s
failings. See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Child. v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 281 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
68. See Pennhurst Gets Increase for ‘66-’67 Budget, MERCURY (Pottstown), Feb. 8, 1966, at 6;
Pennhurst to Transfer 100 Patients to Nursing Homes, MERCURY (Pottstown), Feb. 10, 1966, at 1. By
the fall, state authorities had promised to transfer 600 to 700 Pennhurst residents to less-crowded
facilities in the area. Pennhurst to Transfer Patients, MERCURY (Pottstown), Sept. 15, 1966, at 1.
69. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 100 (3d Cir. 1979).
70. See Step Closer to Reform, MERCURY (Pottstown), Aug. 17, 1966, at 4.
71. Pennhurst Employes [sic] to Form Union, MERCURY (Pottstown), Aug. 12, 1968, at 7.
72. In recognition of the offensiveness of the term “retarded,” PARC later renamed itself the
Arc of Pennsylvania. At this historical moment, however, the term was in widespread use, including in
clinical practice.
73. See FRED PELKA, WHAT WE HAVE DONE: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 133–34 (2012). Haggerty moved his son to a private residential facility in Delaware. Robert
A. Burt, Plaintiffs and Defendants, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 25, at 291. On PARC’s
activities and positions before 1968, see Carey & Gu, supra note 50, at 102–05. Although Haggerty’s
efforts were noteworthy, they were not unique. During the same time period, Robert Nelkin, Ginny
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PARC began with a “Public Awareness Campaign”: for five nights at the
beginning of July 1968, one of the main television news channels in the
Philadelphia area aired disturbing footage from inside Pennhurst.74 Captured by
reporter Bill Baldini and a camera crew (with the consent of Pennhurst
superintendent Leopold Potkonski),75 the footage showed shocking images of
daily life, including, most memorably, nearly naked adolescents confined to cribs
with leather straps.76 “Suffer the Little Children,” the news channel branded the
series.77
A different and equally troubling facet of the institution came into focus
that fall, as PARC learned of a pattern of sexual abuse and assault.78 Male
residents were most commonly the abusers and the victims, employee informants
reported, but there were also anecdotes involving staff members and on-site
construction workers.79 The underground tunnels connecting the campus were
particularly dangerous: aggressors would “drag” victims there or lay in wait for
them.80 Incidents reportedly happened on a “nightly” basis.81 And although
attendants took note, higher-ups declined to investigate further.82 (Residents
Thornburgh, and others were on a similar crusade in the western part of the state. Interview with Robert
Nelkin (June 9, 2021).
74. Public Awareness and Uproar, 11 THE RECORD (Residential Care Comm., Nat’l Ass’n for
Retarded Child., New York, N.Y.), Summer 1968, at 2, Box 11, Folder 27, DENNIS E. HAGGERTY
PAPERS, Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries (Philadelphia, Pa.)
[hereinafter HAGGERTY PAPERS].
75. Bill Baldini, Suffer the Little Children: An Oral Remembrance, in PENNHURST AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 79, 80–81.
76. See Suffer the Little Children (NBC10 Philadelphia 1968), PENNHURST PRES. & MEM’L
ALL., http://www.preservepennhurst.org/default.aspx?pg=26 [https://perma.cc/PC75-6UYH].
77. Baldini connected the title to the Gospel of Mark (Mark 10:14–16). Baldini, supra note 75,
at 82. But the title also echoed a chapter title from an important photographic essay on conditions inside
institutions like Pennhurst: Burton Blatt and Fred Kaplan’s Christmas in Purgatory. That essay, along
with a companion piece in Look Magazine in 1967, attracted widespread attention. See BURTON BLATT
& FRED KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY (1966); Steven J. Taylor, Christmas in Purgatory: A
Retrospective Look, 44 PERSPECTIVES 145, 145 (2006).
78. This initially came to light via an attendant at Pennhurst, who was also the head of the union
at Pennhurst and the husband of another Pennhurst employee. He detailed the situation in a letter to Vice
President of the United States Hubert Humphrey; Humphrey contacted the President’s Committee on
Mental Retardation, which then asked PARC to investigate. Report to Counsel Concerning Possible
Legal Action Against the Department of Welfare and Pennhurst State School and Hospital, n.d., Box
12, Folder 14, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. Around the same time, PARC received a $25,000
grant from the Kennedy Foundation in support of its investigations of Pennsylvania institutions. Janet
Albert-Herman & Elizabeth Coppola, The Rise of Family and Organizational Advocacy, in PENNHURST
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 85, 96.
79. See Notes from Meeting, Oct. 1, 1968, Box 11, Folder 59, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note
74; see also Dennis E. Haggerty, Sexual Abuse at Pennhurst, Sept. 26, 1968, Box 12, Folder 14,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
80. Notes from Meeting, Oct. 1, 1968, at 3, Box 11, Folder 59, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note
74.
81. Id.
82. In one reported instance, a doctor refused to examine a resident who had run “bloddy [sic]
and screaming to an attendant,” stating, “clean him up and put him to bed.” Id.; see also Dennis E.
Haggerty, Sexual Abuse at Pennhurst, Sept. 26, 1968, Box 12, Folder 14, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra
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themselves were not in communication with PARC, but their own accounts
confirm the pattern.)83 PARC leaders were circumspect in what they told the
public, fearing danger to informants and victims,84 but they conveyed the general
pattern in a press release, hoping to gain the attention of state and local
politicians.85
Additional reports of violence and negligence amassed in PARC’s hands as
1968 drew to a close. Twenty-two-year-old Pennhurst resident Joseph Crispo
suffered serious injuries in what Pennhurst officials reported as a bad fall, but
informants described as a severe beating.86 A similar fate befell thirty-eight-yearold Joseph Jaggers.87
Perhaps the greatest parental nightmare, however, was that of Inez
Williams Gantt. On November 24, 1968, Gantt went to visit her teenage son,
John Stark Williams. Records suggest that it was hard for her to do so: she
traveled to Pennhurst from North Philadelphia, where she lived, via a special bus
that PARC arranged for people in her circumstances (“people in the ghetto area,”
as Haggerty remembered it).88 After a three-hour wait at Pennhurst, she learned
that her son had died—a full ten months earlier.89 Gantt never received notice

note 74 (detailing other acts of resident abuse). Around this time, evidence also came to light of
heterosexual activity and abuse, including an unexplained reference to “human fetus” found in locations
where abusers were known to frequent. Report to Counsel Concerning Possible Legal Action Against
the Department of Welfare and Pennhurst State School and Hospital, n.d., Box 12, Folder 14,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
83. Roland Johnson, a Pennhurst resident from 1958 to 1971, detailed his experiences of sexual
abuse and that of other residents in his autobiography. ROLAND JOHNSON, LOST IN A DESERT WORLD
(1994),
https://www.disabilitymuseum.org/dhm/lib/detail.html?id=1681&&page=all
[https://perma.cc/7327-B824]; see also Friedman & Nowell, supra note 18, at 135–36 (discussing a
retreat in which fifty residents disclosed that each had been harmed physically or sexually by a staff
member); Jerry Wheaton, THE PENNHURST PROJECT (2010), http://pennhurstproject.com/Videos.html
[https://perma.cc/WKJ8-BFVY] (describing the brutal attacks he endured as a Pennhurst resident and
implying that he was raped).
84. See Notes from Meeting, Oct. 1, 1968, Box 11, Folder 59, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note
74.
85. Statement by Harold Nathan, President, P.A.R.C., Nov. 13, 1968, Box 9, Folder 22,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74 (noting that “many” “attacks in the mens’ [sic] wards . . . involve[d]
sodomy and certainly assault and battery in the case of the unwilling victim”; describing “the tunnels”
as “frequent[]” sites of attack, where “aggressors lay in wait” for victims; observing Pennhurst’s
disinterest in investigating reported sexual assaults).
86. See Memorandum from Dennis E. Haggerty to Harold Nathan, Jan. 27, 1969, Box 12, Folder
20, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
87. See Edith Taylor, Memorandum, Dec. 2, 1968, Box 12, Folder 17, HAGGERTY PAPERS,
supra note 74.
88. Dennis E. Haggerty, “The Winds of Change” – A Short Story about Penn’s Worst –
Pennhurst, Box 13, Folder 8, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. I acknowledge that the word “ghetto”
is now an offensive term. I include it here because I lack demographic data about Gantt and the word
“ghetto,” when placed in historical context, strongly suggests that Gantt and her family were non-White.
A postmortem report categorized John Stark Williams as Black. Postmortem Report, Box 12, Folder 15,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
89. Haggerty, supra note 88.
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that her son had fallen ill or that he had subsequently died.90 Meanwhile,
Pennhurst had given the body to a local medical school for research.91 For a fee,
a friend of the family was able to reclaim the body, but it was not in a condition
to be viewed.92 Pennhurst disposed of him “like he was an animal,” Williams’s
stepfather angrily told a local newspaper.93
At this point, some PARC leaders began talking quietly of federal
intervention. If Pennsylvania would not meaningfully address Pennhurst’s
failings, might the federal government lean on the state to do so, leveraging the
federal funds that Pennsylvania used to care for its citizens? The abundance of
federal-to-state funding streams made this a plausible approach, used in previous
years by both the Black freedom movement94 and advocates for welfare rights.95
And if federal officials were to intervene, parents’ groups would not have to
spend their own resources or further strain their relationship with state officials.
Not all federal administrators in this era had an appetite for these confrontations,
however.96 The federal public health official that PARC approached in 1968 was
of little help.97
Meanwhile, the situation at Pennhurst only seemed to worsen. Early
January brought death-via-skull-fracture to Joseph Crispo, the patient whose

90. Letter from Dennis E. Haggerty to Thomas W. Georges, Jr., Dec. 11, 1968, Box 12, Folder
15, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
91. PELKA, supra note 73, at 134–35. PARC officials later characterized Williams’s death as
suspicious. Pennhurst authorities had attributed the death to complications from bronchial pneumonia.
But another resident stated that Williams died in a fire, and existing medical records provided some
corroboration of that theory. Id.
92. Pamela Haynes, Dead Boy, 13, Center of Bizarre Mystery at Troubled Pennhurst Retarded
School, PHILA. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1968, at 1.
93. Id.
94. See Jill Quadagno, Promoting Civil Rights Through the Welfare State: How Medicare
Integrated Southern Hospitals, 47 SOC. PROBS. 68, 69 (2000).
95. See generally KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 (2016) (documenting advocates’ awareness of the terms states
agreed to when they accepted federal aid for their public welfare programs and how advocates used that
knowledge to press for fairer and more generous state treatment of welfare applicants and recipients).
96. The legal literature on administrative constitutionalism suggests administrators’ divergent
attitudes around this time towards helping individuals vindicate their rights vis-à-vis state and local
officials. See, e.g., Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, The Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015); Joy Milligan, Plessy
Preserved: Agencies and the Effective Constitution, 129 YALE L.J. 924 (2020).
97. In December of 1968, PARC leaders traveled to Arlington, Virginia to meet with Robert
Jaslow, a Pennsylvania native who was then Chief of the Mental Retardation Branch of the U.S. Public
Health Service. Jaslow could help, PARC leaders believed, because Pennhurst had received at least two
federal grants and was out of compliance with the federal requirements attached to those funds. Jaslow
declined to help “directly” or “openly” but offered “suggestions” as to how PARC might “provide him
opportunities” to intervene. Notes describing Dec. 27, 1968, meeting, Jan. 3, 1969, Box 12, Folder 22,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. PARC followed up on all of these leads but made no apparent
headway. See Letter from Harold Nathan to John Conte, Jan. 3, 1969, Box 12, Folder 22, HAGGERTY
PAPERS, supra note 74; Letter from Harold Nathan to Art Mazer, Jan. 3, 1969, Box 12, Folder 22,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
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suspicious injuries had come to PARC’s attention the previous November.98
April brought two separate scalding incidents, one resulting in death and the
other in serious burns; both could have been avoided had Pennhurst installed
anti-scald valves on the plumbing.99 PARC representatives pleaded with
authorities for investigations at either the county level or the state level.100
“[T]here are just simply too many curious deaths at this one particular facility,”
echoed a letter to the governor from PARC’s Philadelphia branch.101
This was the backdrop for the Halderman litigation, a lawsuit that tried to
use both the aspirations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the strings attached
to federal money to force a state and local response. But first, the story of PARC
v. Pennsylvania. This first federal court lawsuit attempted to rescue the children
of Pennhurst—and in doing so, began to educate state officials about the
intergovernmental consequences of disability rights.
C. Making a Federal Case Out of It102
On May 9, 1969, attendees of PARC’s annual convening took what leaders
considered a “drastic” step: by resolution, the attendees voted to explore some
kind of lawsuit to address the conditions at Pennhurst.103 The word “drastic”
might sound hyperbolic, given how often other reformers at this time used the
courts, but for PARC, the word is apt. Although many PARC parents were
98. Letter from Dennis E. Haggerty to Norman Pine, Jan. 7, 1969, Box 12, Folder 20,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. Around the same time, PARC received a letter from the mother of
Pennhurst resident Joseph Manchor, Jr., detailing his long history of mistreatment. “They are Killing
my son,” she alleged. Letter from Angeline Manchor to Whom It May Concern, Jan. 25, 1969, Box 12,
Folder 18, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
99. According to an inside source, the death occurred after a “working resident” (a resident
whom the institution tasked with a job) used dangerously hot water to bathe another resident, Anna
Owen; five staff members who might have been supervising were drinking coffee in another room.
Owen Case, Apr. 15, 1969, Box 12, Folder 24, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. The other scalding
incident occurred similarly and, according to the resident’s mother, resulted in a four-week hospital stay.
Letter from Gerald Jay Haas to Dennis Haggerty, Mar. 6, 1969, Box 12, Folder 6, HAGGERTY PAPERS,
supra note 74; Letter from Isabel Sheppard to Whom It May Concern, [n.d. but likely March 1969], Box
12, Folder 16, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74; Box 11, Folder 59, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note
74.
100. See Letter from Dennis E. Haggerty to Norman Pine, Apr. 21, 1969, Box 12, Folder 16,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74; Harold Nathan to Raymond P. Shafer, Apr. 17, 1969, Box 12, Folder
24, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74; Harold Nathan to William C. Sennett, Apr. 17, 1969, Box 12,
Folder 24, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
101. Telegram from Gerald Jay Haas to Raymond P. Shafer, Apr. 18, 1969, Box 12, Folder 24,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
102. On how and when this phrase entered the popular lexicon, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 981 & n.223
(2000).
103. Report to Counsel Concerning Possible Legal Action Against the Department of Welfare
and Pennhurst State School and Hospital, n.d., Box 12, Folder 14, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
This is not to say that PARC had given up on state-level reforms. Around the same time PARC
developed a “blueprint” for a state legislative program that would accelerate the creation of communitybased alternatives to Pennhurst-type facilities. Minutes of the Residential Care Committee Meeting,
Mar. 1, 1979, Box 11, Folder 22, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
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financially secure, the group still relied heavily on the educational and social
services that state and local government offered; the parents had labored for
decades to cultivate good relationships with public authorities.104 Over strong
dissents (one prominent member even resigned), the PARC leadership compiled
all the abuses and failings they knew about and handed the record to a lawyer for
advice.105
PARC’s choice of counsel—Thomas Gilhool—suggested a willingness to
think big. Gilhool was a well-connected Philadelphia lawyer who had trained at
Yale Law School at perhaps the height of legal liberalism (he graduated in 1964);
he believed deeply in the power of federal courts to effect progressive social
change.106 By the time PARC reached out, Gilhool had already participated in a
major welfare rights case,107 a longstanding local desegregation battle, and a
legal challenge to an “urban-renewal project.”108 In short, Gilhool was both part
of the establishment and entirely comfortable challenging it. Gilhool also, it
turned out, had a personal investment in the issue: his younger brother was born
with a cognitive disability and had briefly spent time in Pennhurst.109
As Pennhurst’s failings persisted,110 Gilhool outlined various options for
PARC. One was a “right to treatment” lawsuit under the Fourteenth

104. Interview by Lisa Sonneborn with Thomas K. Gilhool, Visionary Voices: Thomas K.
Gilhool,
TEMP.
UNIV.
INST.
ON
DISABILITIES
(Sept.
28,
2011),
https://disabilities.temple.edu/voices/interviews/gilhool [https://perma.cc/8JKE-P4RK]; Gilhool, UC
BERKELEY, supra note 42.
105. The report recounted the incidents described above and others: a twenty-year-old “boy”
named Sofi who had his eyes gouged out by another resident and died five days later; a female resident
stripped and placed in seclusion in a room with heated pipes, and then found dead the next morning
“with burns and blistering on the entire side of the body”; multiple and varied reports of negligent
medical treatment. REPORT TO COUNSEL CONCERNING POSSIBLE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THE
DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE AND PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL, n.d., Box 12, Folder 14,
HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
106. On Yale Law School and legal liberalism, see generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES:
REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS (2005).
107. He was counsel on one of the challenges to residence restrictions that, in consolidated form,
became Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 620 (1969).
108. 1 EARL JUSTICE, JR., TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (2014); Gilhool, UC BERKELEY, supra note 42. The
desegregation battle was over Girard College, a Philadelphia-area institution that resisted integration
well after Brown v. Board of Education and that became a focus of a hard-fought NAACP campaign.
109. PELKA, supra note 73, at 136–37. As Lennard Davis underscored in his account of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, personal connections to disability were crucial to the development of
disability civil rights law. See LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST US MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 3–6 (2015)
(noting that many of the key players who shepherded the ADA into law had experience with disability,
either themselves or via a close family member).
110. In 1969, the institution was clearly still failing. After spending time inside Pennhurst that
fall, one reporter (writing under a pseudonym) confessed that she would kill her own child before
“condemn[ing] him to years of living death at Pennhurst.” Severine Bunuel, Pennhurst, DISTANT
DRUMMER (Phila.), Aug. 29, 1969, Box 11, Folder 26, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. Meanwhile,
actual deaths at Pennhurst continued, such as that of Maria Bondi, age fourteen, who died after drinking
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause111 (not unlike how David Ferleger would
eventually frame the 1974 complaint in the Halderman case). Just as
institutionalized people with mental illness had a right to treatment, the argument
went, Pennhurst’s disabled residents had a constitutional right to a minimum
level of habilitation, and many were not receiving their due.112 But ultimately
Gilhool and PARC settled on a different tactic. Their carefully crafted class
action lawsuit against the State said nothing about conditions at Pennhurst;
rather, the suit alleged that the State’s public education system had denied
children with intellectual and developmental disabilities the equal protection of
the law.113 Should the lawsuit succeed, Gilhool and his clients believed, it would
benefit all children with intellectual and developmental disabilities in the state.
It would also have the happy consequence of getting some children out of places
like Pennhurst, because it would be clear that institutionalized children were not
receiving the educational opportunities guaranteed by law. Banging on the front
doors of the state’s public schools, PARC hoped to throw open the back doors at
Pennhurst.114
PARC’s education lawsuit, with its many resonances with Brown v. Board
of Education (1954) and its sympathetic school-age plaintiffs, landed well.115
After a single day of testimony at a preliminary hearing in August 1971, the
parties came together to craft a consent agreement. Indeed, state officials seemed
to welcome being under court order.116 The agreement, which the court approved
detergent. Gene Harris & John Clancy, State Panel Studies ‘Detergent’ Death of Girl, 14, at Pennhurst,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 1, 1969, at 41, Box 11, Folder 26, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74.
111. This was still early days in the development of the right to treatment. See, e.g., Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 567 (1975)
(originally filed in 1971 as a right to treatment case). For a useful reconstruction of the legal landscape
at this juncture and after, see Judith A. Gran, From PARC to Pennhurst: The Legal Argument for
Equality, in PENNHURST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 104.
112. Letter from L. Steuart Brown to PARC Board of Directors et al., Feb. 6, 1970, Box 10,
Folder 35, HAGGERTY PAPERS, supra note 74. Gilhool also raised the idea of a Thirteenth Amendment
claim on the basis of the unpaid labor that Pennhurst required of some residents. If successful, his
thinking went, such a suit would make Pennhurst too costly for the state to operate and force
development of non-institutional alternatives. Id. David Ferleger would later pursue just this theory in
Downs v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The resulting settlement significantly
curtailed the use of resident labor. On this line of case law, see RUTHIE-MARIE BECKWITH, DISABILITY
SERVITUDE: FROM PEONAGE TO POVERTY (2016).
113. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Child. v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The
lawsuit targeted a state law that allowed schools to exclude children who had not reached a “mental age
of five years” by the time they should be enrolling in first grade. Id. at 282.
114. On this strategy, see Gilhool, UC BERKELEY, supra note 42; Gran, supra note 111. A
complementary explanation is that for Gilhool and his clients, Brown v. Board of Education represented
legal heroism; a Brown-like case had obvious appeal. See PELKA, supra note 73, at 138 (quoting Gilhool
as saying that “all of us at law school, and then after law school, in anything we were doing, were
constantly tuned into” the school desegregation lawsuits unfolding around the country).
115. See e-mail from Robert Nelkin to Karen Tani, June 10, 2021 (on file with author)
(suggesting that top decisionmakers in the State’s Department of Education greeted the lawsuit warmly
and welcomed the opportunity to collaborate).
116. See DONALD N. JENSEN, PURSE, SWORD, AND JUDGMENT: THE IMPACT OF COURT
INTERVENTION ON SOCIAL POLICY 29 (1984).
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the following spring, had far-reaching effects. Most notably, the agreement
required the State to search out children with intellectual and developmental
disabilities, whether currently in school or not, and to provide them with a free
program of education appropriate to their learning capacities.117 Along with a
similar case in the District of Columbia,118 the PARC litigation helped spark a
sea change in public education in the United States.119 The Education of
Handicapped Children Act of 1975120 took the basic guarantees from the PARC
case and extended them nationwide, dramatically improving the prospects of an
entire class of children. At the same time, this law and others like it imposed vast
new costs on the states (the federal government has always provided some funds
to states to help meet this obligation, but never enough).
Although PARC saw the education lawsuit as an unqualified victory, the
suit’s resolution did not directly address the conditions at Pennhurst, nor did it
say anything about the rights of residents older than age twenty-one. That lawsuit
would not come until lawyer David Ferleger learned about Terri Lee Halderman.
By then, the State was no longer in a settling mood. The year before the PARC
education case, Pennsylvania had spent $64 million on special education in
public and state-supported private schools. That number multiplied rapidly after
1972 (nearly quadrupling by 1979-80).121 The education case had also spawned
a new special education bureaucracy and produced a seemingly endless stream
of follow-on litigation in federal court as parents advocated for the rights of their
children.122 The message was clear: disability rights could be very costly and
policymaking-via-litigation carried significant risks for state actors.
D. Pennhurst on Trial
Terri Lee Halderman was in some ways a typical Pennhurst resident. She
had experienced brain damage shortly after birth, leaving her with serious
intellectual and developmental impairments. As she grew, she gained physical
strength and mobility, but only a very limited ability to care for herself. She
entered Pennhurst in 1966, at the age of eleven, when the Halderman family was
unable to meet her needs at home and after her size and energy outpaced the
capacities of the smaller, private facility that had accepted her at age nine.123
117. See 343 F. Supp. at 306, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
118. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). Congress codified the
guarantees articulated in the PARC and Mills decisions in 1975 when it enacted the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
119. On the history and impact of this case, see generally LEOPOLD LIPPMAN & I. IGNACY
GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (1973).
120. At the time of this law’s enactment, “handicapped” was a commonly used term for people
with disabilities; lawmakers were not alert to the term’s derogatory connotations. When reauthorizing
this statute in 1990, Congress changed its name to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
121. JENSEN, supra note 116, at 56.
122. Id. at 30–62.
123. Burt, supra note 73, at 281–83.
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What was not typical about Terri Lee Halderman was the consistent postadmission attention that she received from her mother (attention that Pennhurst
surprisingly allowed). Winifred Halderman visited almost every week and
watched, distressed, as her daughter’s condition deteriorated. Terri Lee
Halderman had tended to bang her head on hard surfaces, and this tendency
increased.124 She lost her ability to communicate verbally.125 Winifred
Halderman was also alarmed by the conditions she observed—so neglectful that
she once found another resident lying unattended, “face down in a pool of urine
and later eating feces from a toilet.”126 She complained repeatedly to Pennhurst
employees and received sympathetic but ineffectual responses. In 1973, one
administrator finally suggested that she file a lawsuit. “Call David Ferleger and
sue me,” the administrator allegedly said.127
That an employee would do such a thing is entirely believable. Those who
worked at Pennhurst saw the same problems that Winifred Halderman did, and
the ones who had been around long enough knew how hard it was to wheedle
adequate resources out of even a scandalized state legislature.128 A lawsuit had
the potential to compel the flow of funds.129
That this employee thought of David Ferleger also makes sense, even
though Ferleger had only received his JD the year before. The son of two
Holocaust survivors130 and an acolyte of “welfare law guru” Edward Sparer at
the University of Pennsylvania, Ferleger had gone straight from law school to a
pioneering legal advocacy project he had developed at a nearby state-run mental
hospital.131 Just as Sparer had taken up the cause of welfare recipients, with little
concern for the ire of state and local officials, Ferleger fearlessly pursued the
rights of people in mental hospitals—including by suing the very hospital
superintendent who gave him space for his project.132 Such actions made
124. Id.
125. Id. at 283.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Interview with David Ferleger (July 31, 2019). The staff member was George A.
Kopchik, later Pennhurst’s superintendent. Id.
128. Bill Baldini recalls that when he filmed “Suffer the Little Children” at Pennhurst in 1968,
“at least half the staff was ecstatic. Because they knew it was wrong. They just couldn’t change the
system.” Baldini, supra note 75, at 81.
129. See Bagenstos, The Past and Future, supra note 6, at 17 (“[W]orkers in institutions were
among the drivers of some of the early deinstitutionalization litigation.”). Cf. Margo Schlanger, Civil
Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550,
562 (2006) (noting that “[p]rison and jail officials were frequently collaborators” in prison reform
litigation in the 1970s).
130. Gran, supra note 111, at 117.
131. See Interview with David Ferleger, supra note 127. On Edward Sparer as “welfare law
guru,” see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1960-1973 22 (1993); see also Edward V. Sparer, Role of the Welfare Client’s Lawyer, 12 UCLA L.
REV. 361 (1965) (explaining the role lawyers could and should play in helping poor people navigate the
public welfare system).
132. See Interview with David Ferleger, supra note 127. The case against that superintendent—
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 119 (1977)—led to important
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Ferleger a known quantity among Philadelphia-area institutions. Ferleger took
the Halderman case and on May 30, 1974, filed a complaint in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.
Over the next two years, the case expanded and changed in several
important ways. Additional Pennhurst residents joined Terri Lee Halderman as
named plaintiffs. PARC successfully moved to intervene as a party plaintiff,
picking up where the group’s education case had left off and bringing Gilhool’s
considerable legal acumen to the case.133 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
also intervened on the plaintiffs’ side, which injected enormous resources into
the litigation.134 Last, and of great significance, in early 1976, Gilhool and then
Ferleger filed Amended Complaints asking the court to order Pennhurst’s closure
(merely reforming the institution, in other words, would not do).135
The 1977 trial at last laid the full horrors of Pennhurst before a federal court.
The trial judge, as it turned out, was already acquainted with the situation. Judge
Raymond Broderick had been part of the three-judge panel that heard the PARC
education case. Moreover, when he served as Lieutenant Governor (1967-1971),
he had seen Pennhurst with his own eyes.136 Still, the information that emerged
at trial put Pennhurst in a new light. More than eighty witnesses testified,
including three former residents and thirty-nine employees.137 Every morning for
pronouncements about the due process rights of juveniles facing civil commitment in a psychiatric
facility. In terms of law school influences, Ferleger also recalls taking a class called “asylums and jails”
with psychiatrist Richard Lonsdorf and law professor James O. Freedman. Interview with David
Ferleger, supra note 127; Richard G. Lonsdorf, Adventures with Jim—An Appreciation, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 265, 266 (1981) (describing the content of that course).
133. According to PARC lawyer Judith Gran, PARC always intended to follow up on its victory
in the education case with a lawsuit aimed at “creat[ing] opportunities for community living for
institutional residents.” But the group was waiting to file that suit until a state court had an opportunity
to construe the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. After Ferleger filed
the Halderman case, PARC naturally sought to join forces. Gran, supra note 111, at 117; see also Letter
from C. A. Peters to Executive Committee, Allegheny County Chapter of the Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Children, Dec. 7, 1972, personal papers of Robert Nelkin (on file with author) (describing
a PARC “Right to Treatment” suit as “in the making”).
134. Interview with Arthur Peabody (Jan. 19, 2021). In an ironic twist, the person who was
perhaps most instrumental in securing the DOJ’s participation—Dick Thornburgh—would as governor
oversee two appeals to the Supreme Court. See L. Steuart Brown to Richard Thornburgh, May 15, 1979,
Box 2, Folder 13, Bob Nelkin Collection of ACC-PARC Records, Heinz History Center (Pittsburgh,
Pa.),
https://historicpittsburgh.org/islandora/object/pitt%3AMSS_1002_B002_F13_I02
[https://perma.cc/Z4F8-FR62].
135. Burt, supra note 73, at 285, 310.
136. In that role, Judge Broderick later told David Ferleger, he had also helped constituents get
their relatives into Pennhurst. Interview with David Ferleger, supra note 127. That there was always a
waiting list for Pennhurst, despite documented problems, reflects the pressures that families experienced
in this era. Without adequate resources for home-based care for relatives with developmental and
intellectual disabilities, and often advised by doctors to pursue institutionalization, some families
perceived places like Pennhurst as their best option. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The
Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 FAMILY L.Q. 153, 191–97
(1978).
137. David Ferleger & Patrice Maguire Scott, Rights and Dignity: Congress, the Supreme Court,
and People with Disabilities After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 327, 346 (1983).
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thirty-two days, Ferleger stacked piles of boxes labeled “restraints” in front of
his table—a reminder of the hours on end that Pennhurst residents spent in the
most restrictive conditions, all meticulously documented by Pennhurst’s own
staff.138 Even the defendants’ experts had little good to say, concluding in one
report that for “literally hundreds of reasons,” Pennhurst was “simply too far
beyond repair” to “be made into an adequate facility.”139
The trial court’s decision in the Halderman v. Pennhurst case is legendary
among advocates for deinstitutionalization and disability rights. On December
23, 1977, Judge Broderick delivered an opinion that chronicled Pennhurst’s
problems in bracing detail: gross understaffing, resulting in minimal efforts to
educate, train, and habilitate residents; overuse of physical restraints,
psychotropic drugs, and seclusion rooms; conditions that produced and enabled
serious harms, ranging from pinworm infections, to bitten-off earlobes, to rape;
and a physical environment that was unsanitary (“[t]here is often excrement and
urine on ward floors”), excessively noisy, and more likely to cause residents to
lose the skills they had than to help them acquire new ones.140
Judge Broderick went on to conclude that “when a state involuntarily
commits” people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the state “provide them with
such habilitation as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and
maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their capacities
permit.”141 This right extended to residents who were not court committed, Judge
Broderick added, because when it came to both admission and release,
“voluntariness . . . is an illusory concept”; “Pennhurst residents had no practical
alternative at the time of their admission and at the present time, they have no
place else to go.”142 Having established the existence of a constitutional right to
habilitation, Judge Broderick went on to find that the defendants in this case had
violated it: Pennhurst residents “have not received, and are not receiving,
minimally adequate habilitation.”143 What is more, Judge Broderick found, in
what at the time was a striking and novel conclusion, “minimally adequate
habilitation cannot be provided in an institution such as Pennhurst.”144
Judge Broderick shored up this novel constitutional finding with a bevy of
additional legal findings. He held that Pennhurst residents had a right to be free
from harm, protected under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; that they
had a constitutional right to non-discriminatory habilitation (that is, to “at least
as much education and training” as the state afforded to others), protected under
138. Interview with David Ferleger, supra note 127.
139. Ferleger & Scott, supra note 137, at 346 (citing the 1977 Trial Transcript).
140. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1306–08 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff’d in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev’d, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
141. Id. at 1317–18.
142. Id. at 1311, 1318.
143. Id. at 1318.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that they had a state
statutory right to minimally adequate habilitation (under the Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1966); and that they had a federal statutory right to
non-discriminatory habilitation, under Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act. The defendants had violated all of these rights.145
An order for injunctive relief followed three months later. Taking
inspiration, perhaps, from the structural injunctions that famously desegregated
public schools in the American South and, more directly, from a historic district
court decision in the Alabama patients’ rights case Wyatt v. Stickney,146 Judge
Broderick required the defendants to “provide suitable community living
arrangements” for everyone currently residing at Pennhurst (approximately
1,200 persons), as well as all those on the waiting list.147 He further required the
defendants to provide whatever services were necessary to support “minimally
adequate habilitation” in these community placements.148 And as the defendants
made those arrangements, under the guidance of a court-appointed special
master, Judge Broderick prohibited them from admitting new residents to
Pennhurst.149 In this regard, Judge Broderick went significantly beyond Wyatt or
any other “right to treatment” case.150 His opinion and order signaled that
Pennhurst would not be salvaged; its population would be gradually integrated
into the community until the institution itself ceased to exist.151

145. Id. at 1314, 1320–21. When the Pennsylvania state legislature enacted the Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, medical professionals, government officials, and the general public
routinely used the term “retardation” to describe the condition of having an intellectual or developmental
disability. This term is now disfavored, owing to its derogatory connotations.
146. See 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); see
also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (finding that the entire Arkansas prison system
violated the Constitution), aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). There is an ample contemporaneous
literature on how federal court judges at this time were approaching their role and deploying their
equitable powers. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976); Paul S. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
949 (1978); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661
(1978); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982).
147. 446 F. Supp. at 1326.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1326–27.
150. See Gran, supra note 111, at 115 (explaining that whereas other “right to treatment” cases
“fail[ed] to challenge the institutional model,” the district court decision in Pennhurst cast that model as
incompatible with habilitation).
151. 446 F. Supp. at 1326–29.
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II.
“THE CHARACTER OF AN INSTITUTION”: PENNHURST MEETS THE “NEW
FEDERALISM”
Had the case ended after the trial, the Pennhurst litigation would still have
a prominent place in U.S. history—as an example of one force, among several,
that tipped the scales away from the mass institutionalization of people with
disabilities in state-run facilities152 toward other forms of care (and, in some
cases, other institutional confinements).153 But the case did not end there. As the
State Attorney General’s office put it in a memo to the State Department of
Public Welfare, the district court’s rulings were “both unprecedented and
unpalatable.”154 They would not go uncontested.
On appeal, the Pennhurst case took several unanticipated turns, resulting in
Supreme Court decisions that said very little about the status of people like Terri
Lee Halderman, but a lot about federal-state relationships. More specifically,
these decisions addressed the role of federal power in incentivizing, regulating,
and disciplining state-level actors. Since Reconstruction, at least, the power of
federal courts over state actors had been one of the great questions hovering over
American politics and policy. Progressive and New Deal reforms presented a
second great question: to what extent could Congress use its spending power to
create the kind of social and economic citizenship that federal policymakers
desired to see out in the states? The Civil Rights Act and other federal statutes
from subsequent decades added a third question: were private lawsuits against
state and local officials a fair and appropriate vehicle for enforcing Congress’s
will? The Pennhurst litigation would provide new answers, with consequences
extending well beyond the plaintiff class.

152. On the factors that contributed to deinstitutionalization, see PARSONS, supra note 47; BENMOSHE, supra note 8, at 37–68. On Pennhurst’s significance to deinstitutionalization, see BEN-MOSHE,
supra note 8, at 236, 238; Gran, supra note 111, at 119.
153. By “other forms of institutionalization,” I refer to nursing homes, smaller congregate care
facilities, jails, and prisons. See PARSONS, supra note 47; DISABILITY INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT
AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman & Allison C.
Carey eds., 2014). Scholars of deinstitutionalization resist the notion that deinstitutionalization led
directly to mass incarceration, but also note the overrepresentation of disability in incarcerated
populations today.
154. Memorandum from Norman J. Watkins to Aldo Colautti, Dec. 4, 1978, personal papers of
Robert Nelkin (on file with author); see also Aldo Colautti to Milton J. Shapp, Mar. 29, 1978, personal
papers of Robert Nelkin (on file with author) (estimating that complying with the district court’s order
would cost the state $25 million, over and above the $35 million already committed to Pennhurst);
Reasons for Appeal, personal papers of Robert Nelkin (on file with author) (recounting the reasons that
various high-level state officials offered in early 1978 for appealing the Pennhurst case).

2022]

THE PENNHURST DOCTRINES

1183

A. Pennhurst I and the Clear Statement Rule
The first appeal was to the Third Circuit, which heard the case en banc in
1979 after a three-judge panel was unable to produce a majority opinion.155 The
en banc decision, issued almost exactly two years after the remarkable district
court decision on the merits, reversed a few aspects of Judge Broderick’s
remedial decree, but otherwise affirmed his judgment.156 Like Judge Broderick,
the Third Circuit found that Pennhurst’s residents had a legal right to treatment
and to habilitation and that the defendants had violated these rights.157
The circuit court did not reach this conclusion via the same path as the
district court, however, and its alternative route became the basis for the Supreme
Court’s first Pennhurst decision (Pennhurst I).158 Following the canon of
constitutional avoidance, the circuit court looked first to the potential statutory
bases for the plaintiffs’ cause of action159 and, specifically, to possible federal
statutory bases.160 The circuit court also chose to rely on a federal statute
different from the district court. Rather than basing its decision on Section 504
of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, a relatively untested anti-discrimination
provision,161 the circuit court found a valid claim under the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 (the DD Act), which
Congress had enacted after the initiation of the Halderman lawsuit and which
the plaintiffs had asserted as a source of relief in their second amended
complaint.162
The horror stories coming out of Pennhurst (and elsewhere) were in fact
part of the motivation for the DD Act, which used the lure of federal funds to
encourage states to do more for people with developmental disabilities. Previous
laws, such as the Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963 and the
Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act of 1970,
evinced concern for this population, but the DD Act more explicitly favored
community-based programs and services.163 It offered states even more financial
incentives to deinstitutionalize and it included a “bill of rights” setting forth the

155. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 100, 116 (3d Cir. 1979), rev’d,
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 5–32 (1981).
159. Halderman, 612 F.2d at 104, 116.
160. Relying primarily on a state statute was not preferable, the court explained, because a state
court might reject the federal court’s interpretation of the applicable state statute. Id. at 94.
161. Owing to administrative foot-dragging, there were no implementing regulations for Section
504 until 1977. See RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING
FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 128 (1984). The Supreme Court did not take up a Section 504 case until
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
162. 612 F.2d at 95.
163. See Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282; Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486.
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treatment, services, and habilitation that people with developmental disabilities
were entitled to receive.164
In interpreting the DD Act in the Pennhurst case, the circuit court made
three important legal findings. First, by its plain language, the Act conferred
upon developmentally disabled individuals “a right to treatment and
habilitation,” as well as a right to “the least restrictive environment” (which for
some individuals might be an institutional setting but in many other cases would
not be).165 Second, states that accepted funding under the Act were required to
comply with the Act’s rights-affirming language.166 Third, the Act conferred
upon individual beneficiaries—here, people with developmental disabilities—a
private right of action.167 Such a right of action could arguably “infringe basic
state prerogatives, and transgress the bounds of federal law making
competence,” the circuit court recognized. But that concern was misplaced in
this case, where (in the court’s view) Congress had legislated pursuant to its
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment rather than solely its authority
under the Spending Clause.168
Having secured this alternative federal statutory basis for affirming the
district court’s decision, the circuit court moved on to the attached, or “pendent,”
state law claim.169 This claim provided an alternative, independent ground for a
right to treatment and habilitation.170 Pennsylvania’s Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966 set forth a state duty “[t]o assure . . . the availability and
equitable provision of adequate mental health and mental retardation services for
all persons who need them.”171 In the circuit court’s reading, this language
created an affirmative right, enforceable by private litigants against both state
and county defendants.172 Combined with the factual findings in the case, these
legal interpretations meant that the core of Judge Broderick’s 1977 order would
remain in place.173
Unless, of course, the defendants chose to appeal the case to the Supreme
Court and secured a reversal. This choice is worth underscoring. Litigating at the
Supreme Court level is expensive. Teams of lawyers spend hours preparing, and
litigants often retain experienced (i.e., expensive) advocates to argue before the
Court. In this instance, an appeal also seemed out of step with the direction that
some states were voluntarily headed: around the country, states were downsizing
164. 89 Stat. 486. On Willowbrook in the years leading up to the DD Act, see generally DAVID
J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS: BRINGING THE MENTALLY
DISABLED INTO THE COMMUNITY (1984).
165. 612 F.2d at 97, 107.
166. Id. at 99.
167. Id. at 97–98.
168. Id. at 95–100, 104–07.
169. Id. at 103.
170. Id. at 95–107.
171. Id. at 100.
172. Id. at 100–03.
173. See id at 95–116.
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institutions, recognizing that they were a drag on state finances and that federal
funds were available for community living.174 The plaintiffs’ lawyers begged the
state attorney general not to appeal further;175 similar efforts were underway in
the governor’s office, where PARC had allies.176
But the state officials calling the shots for the defendants177 appeared to be
taking an even longer view, seeing in this appeal the chance to make a broader
argument about federal courts and state power.178 In the words of one of the
defendants’ briefs to the Supreme Court, the lower court decision “would open
[the federal] courts to innumerable lawsuits by developmentally disabled persons
seeking to dispute the nature or setting of their treatment.”179 This, in turn, would
lead to federal courts “displac[ing] state and local governments as the
decisionmakers empowered to determine the proper allocation of resources and
the appropriate treatment for each developmentally disabled person.”180 The
remaining role for the states was pathetic: they would merely “fund and
implement the treatment prescribed by the federal court.”181
The defendants’ appeal reached the Supreme Court at an auspicious time
for state governments. During the Warren Court years, the Court’s approach to
civil rights and civil liberties had often seemed to come at the expense of the
states. Chief Justice Warren’s departure in 1969 gave President Nixon a chance
to reorient the Court, via the appointment of Warren Burger. Two additional
appointment opportunities arose for President Nixon in 1971 with the retirement
of Justice John Marshall Harlan II and Justice Hugo Black. Harlan, though
sometimes on the dissenting side of Warren Court decisions,182 voted in favor of
civil rights in key cases183 and was known for advancing a broad interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.184 Black had been a reliable
defender of the New Deal185 and a famous proponent of applying all the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights against the states (“total incorporation”).186

174. BEN-MOSHE, supra note 8, at 254–55; VALERIE J. BRADLEY, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND GUIDE 34–36 (1978).
175. Letter from Thomas K. Gilhool to Edward G. Beister (May 4, 1979) (on file with author).
176. Interview with Robert Nelkin (June 9, 2021); Letter from Robert Nelkin to Richard
Thornburgh (July 27, 1979) (on file with author).
177. Letter from Richard Thornburgh to Richard A. McClatchy, Jr. (Feb. 5, 1980) (on file with
author) (explaining that the county defendants appeared inclined to follow the state’s lead).
178. Speaker of the State House of Representatives H. Jack Seltzer urged Governor Thornburgh
to “uphold the rights of our Commonwealth.” Letter from H. Jack Seltzer to Richard Thornburgh (Jan.
23, 1980) (on file with author).
179. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451
U.S. 1 (1981) (Nos. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1415 & 79-1489).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589–632 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
184. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509–55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
185. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 5 (1998).
186. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70–72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).

1186

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:1157

Black’s fellow Roosevelt appointee Justice William O. Douglas left the Court
four years later, in 1975. His replacement, Justice John Paul Stevens, was only a
modest counterweight to the other three Justices whom Nixon appointed: Harry
Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, and William Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist would
write the Court’s decision in Pennhurst I.187
Rehnquist’s special concern for states was well established by that point.
His decision in the 1976 case National League of Cities v. Usery, holding that
state employees could not be subjected to a federal minimum wage law, is
perhaps the most famous example.188 Though formally overruled less than a
decade later, it “plainly invigorated the Tenth Amendment” and signaled to
lower courts and court watchers a shift in the winds.189
But even more salient to this Article is Justice Rehnquist’s 1976 opinion in
Rizzo v. Goode.190 Multiple groups of Philadelphia residents, including the local
chapter of the Black Panther Party, had sued the mayor, the police commissioner,
and other local officials over the police department’s allegedly persistent
mistreatment of Black citizens, in violation of the U.S. Constitution.191 After two
long trials, the district court judge (from the same district as Judge Broderick)
ordered the defendants to formulate “a comprehensive program for dealing
adequately with civilian complaints,” subject to the court’s guidelines.192 On
appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Notably, the district court’s order of equitable
relief was weaker than what the plaintiffs wanted and was modest compared to
what federal courts were doing in school desegregation cases.193 This relative
modesty helps explain why amici ranging from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to the Philadelphia Bar Association urged the Supreme Court to
affirm.194
Writing for the majority in Rizzo, Justice Rehnquist nonetheless held that
the disputed court order swept far too broadly, in ways that offended bedrock

187. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 5 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., writing for the Court).
188. See 426 U.S. 833, 835–56 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
189. Richard J. Lazarus, Rehnquist’s Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 861, 864 (2003).
190. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
191. For a rich excavation of this case’s backstory, see Vivek Kembaiyan, The Philadelphia
Black Panther Party’s Attempt to Assert Community Control Over Police Through Litigation (May 14,
2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Kembaiyan explains that the district court
eventually dropped the Black Panthers from the suit “because of their refusal to submit to discovery.”
Id. at 20. On law-and-order politics in Philadelphia during Frank Rizzo’s ascendance and leadership, see
TIMOTHY J. LOMBARDO, BLUE-COLLAR CONSERVATISM: FRANK RIZZO’S PHILADELPHIA AND
POPULIST POLITICS (2018); Eric C. Schneider, Christopher Agee & Themis Chronopoulos, Dirty Work:
Police and Community Relations and the Limits of Liberalism in Postwar Philadelphia, 2 J. URB. HIST.
1 (2017).
192. 423 U.S. at 369.
193. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1261; see also Kembaiyan, supra note 191, at 19 (noting that
the district court order “deeply disappointed” the plaintiffs).
194. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1261.
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federalism principles.195 Federal courts had to be “constantly mindful” of how
federal equitable power might impinge on a state’s prerogatives, he wrote;
injunctions of state officials were an “extraordinary” remedy, to be viewed in the
same skeptical light as interference with state judicial proceedings.196
The Rizzo precedent would seem to bode ill for the Pennhurst plaintiffs and
the much more sweeping remedial decree they sought to preserve. As legal
scholar Louise Weinberg observed, Rizzo suggested that, notwithstanding “Ex
parte Young, section 1983 and Brown II,” a federal trial court could not “fashion
a prospective remedy to discourage deprivations of constitutional rights.”197 It
was almost as if federalism prohibited interference with state officials who failed
to protect against such deprivations.198
As it turned out, Justice Rehnquist stopped shy of striking down the
remedial order in Pennhurst.199 Instead, he held that the Third Circuit had
misapplied federal law when it upheld Judge Broderick’s decision.200 This
alternative holding would turn out to have momentous federalism implications
of its own, but Justice Rehnquist obscured them in the measured language of
statutory construction.201
The statutory interpretation exercise unfolded in several steps. First, Justice
Rehnquist emphasized the need for clarity from Congress about the source of its
power when imposing “affirmative obligations on the States to fund certain
services.”202 The Third Circuit had named the Fourteenth Amendment as the
source, thereby linking the DD Act to the project of Reconstruction and the value
of equality.203 Not so fast, said Justice Rehnquist.204 Unless Congress expressly
invoked its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment—not the case here—
the Court would not infer that they intended to do so.205 The Court proceeded,
then, as if Congress enacted the DD Act pursuant to its Spending Power (i.e., as
if it were nothing more than a “typical funding statute”).206
This first step enabled a crucial second step, now so woven into the fabric
of our law that it is difficult to appreciate. According to Justice Rehnquist,
“legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a

195. 423 U.S. at 378–81.
196. Id. at 378–79; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (criticizing federal district
court judges for becoming too “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations,” under cover of enforcing
the U.S. Constitution).
197. Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1218.
198. Id.
199. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1981).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 16–31 (grounding the analysis in statutory interpretation principles).
202. Id. at 16–17.
203. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 649–61 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc),
rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
204. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 5–3.
205. Id. at 15–18, 22.
206. Id.
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contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions.”207 Continuing with this contract analogy, Justice Rehnquist
emphasized the importance of a state “voluntarily and knowingly accept[ing] the
terms” and the presumed invalidity of a term which a state was “unaware” or
“unable to ascertain” the meaning of.208 “[I]f Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously,” Justice
Rehnquist insisted.209
In the case of the DD Act, Justice Rehnquist continued, “Congress fell well
short of providing clear notice to the States” that the sweeping language in the
“bill of rights” section functioned as a “condition” for receipt of federal funds.210
This was not a matter of sloppy drafting, in his view, but a sign that Congress
never intended to bind the states in this way.211 Congress “plainly understood the
difference, financial and otherwise, between encouraging a specified type of
treatment and mandating it.”212 To find such a mandate now, he implied, would
be akin to ripping open a clear contract and adding a contradictory term.213 The
Court would not hold states to such a bargain.214
The majority opinion concluded by giving the plaintiffs a faint glimmer of
hope. It remanded the case to the Third Circuit to consider several issues,
including whether some other provision of the DD Act might support the district
court’s decision (although Justice Rehnquist sounded several notes of skepticism
here) and whether some other source of federal law might provide a basis for
relief.215 The Court also ordered the Third Circuit to reconsider its interpretation
of the state Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, suggesting (without
elaboration) that the circuit court’s construction of this state law “may well have
been colored” by an erroneous interpretation of the federal DD Act.216
It was a clever decision, noted Michael McConnell, a conservative lawyer
who at the time of Pennhurst I was serving as assistant general counsel to the
Reagan Administration’s Office of Management and Budget and would go on to
a notable career as a judge and law professor.217 Indeed, it was so clever that
McConnell made it the centerpiece of his remarks at the first-ever conference of

207. Id. at 17.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 20, 25–26.
211. See id. at 27.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power
thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”).
214. See id. at 15–32.
215. Id. at 30–31.
216. Id.
217. See Michael W. McConnell, The Politics of Returning Power to the States, 6 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 103–08 (1982). On the import of this convening and the Federalist Society more broadly,
see generally AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2019).
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the Federalist Society, held in 1982 at Yale Law School.218 In McConnell’s
words, Justice Rehnquist “skillfully” “put to conservative use” what McConnell
recognized as “a famous, well-tried, and well-beloved liberal device”: “deciding
that [a] statute means something other than what it otherwise appears to say” out
of a purported desire to avoid potential “constitutional problems.”219 Here, the
potential constitutional problem came via the Tenth Amendment. Citing his own
recent opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, Justice Rehnquist implied
that surely this amendment must impose some limit on the Spending Power.220
To avoid this looming Tenth Amendment problem, McConnell noted with
admiration, Justice Rehnquist advanced “a narrow reading of the statute,”
different from “what it apparently meant on its face.”221 In doing so, he “create[d]
a new mode of interpreting all grant statutes.”222
As McConnell explained it, the “new principle of statutory construction”
was this: “any limitations or conditions on State activity imposed as an exercise
of Spending Power authority must be precisely stated or the States (and the
courts) will be free to ignore them.”223 The implications of this principle, now
known as the “clear statement rule,” were profound. “This could be an extremely
useful doctrine for recovering for the States some measure of the power that has
been seduced away from them by the proffer of grants,” McConnell predicted
(echoing critiques voiced in conservative circles since at least the New Deal),
“because very few [federal] statutes . . . phrase their conditions in anything close
to precise language.”224 “Congressional activists” might continue to try to fulfill
their “do good”-er impulse by creating ever-more expansive rights and
responsibilities, but when they did so through federal-state grants-in-aid, federal
courts now had “a solid doctrinal basis” for protecting the states from the costs
of Congress’s hubris.225
Not everyone, of course, was so appreciative of Justice Rehnquist’s
handiwork. Tom Gilhool, one of the lawyers on the plaintiffs’ side, would later
concede the weakness of the DD Act argument,226 but other commentators at the
218. McConnell, supra note 217, at 103–08.
219. Id. at 106–07. McConnell, a former law clerk to Justice William Brennan, was wellpositioned to know of such devices.
220. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13 (citing Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
842–43 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
221. McConnell, supra note 217, at 107, 109.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 109.
224. Id.; see also Stewart A. Baker, Making the Most of Pennhurst’s “Clear Statement” Rule, 31
CATH. U. L. REV. 439, 441 (1982) (“State and local governments concerned about litigation over the
‘strings’ attached to federal aid will find, in Pennhurst, a broad new basis for resisting excessive federal
mandates.”). On conservative critiques of federal-state grants-in-aid and the way they seduced power
away from the states, see generally TANI, supra note 95.
225. McConnell, supra note 217, at 109–10; see also Baker, supra note 224, at 439 (recognizing
Pennhurst I as holding great potential value to lawyers representing state and local governments).
226. In the world of disability activism, Gilhool later recalled, “nobody thought” that the states
should have to carry out all the “lovely language” in the DD Act’s “[b]ill of [r]ights”; he and the other
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time believed it was a good one,227 as did representatives from the U.S.
Department of Justice and three of Justice Rehnquist’s fellow Justices.228 As
Justice Marshall put it in a pre-decision memo to his colleagues, no one actually
disputed “that Congress had in mind Pennhurst and other institutions like it”
when it added the “bill of rights” language to the DD Act.229 The real issue in the
case seemed to be Judge Broderick’s remedial decree, which arguably swept too
broadly and gave Pennsylvania an insufficient opportunity to comply with the
law. Why not, then, simply remand the case and order that “the remedy track the
statute,” as the Court had done in the 1970 grant-in-aid case Rosado v.
Wyman?230 Justice White picked up on this idea in dissent, noting that this
approach would meet the Court’s main concerns without “mak[ing] nugatory”
actions that Congress had “carefully undertaken.”231
That the Court did not follow this established route raised concerns about
what this case portended. In Professor Judith Baer’s words, the majority
“implicitly conceded that both the Spending Power and the Fourteenth
Amendment give Congress the power to do what the plaintiffs argue the Act has
done” only to then “balk at concluding that Congress really intended” to do what
it said.232 It was a decision that entertained “[e]very possible presumption . . . in
favor of congressional circumspection and state autonomy.”233
B. Pennhurst II and the New Sovereign Immunity
“Did you ever see a kid scared of himself?” former Pennhurst resident
Alfred Pitts asked David Ferleger in 1981.234 “That’s how it was,” Pitts
recalled.235 “Forcing people to do things outside their own will. It looked bloody.
It looked terrible. The way the patients looked, the way the patients sat on the
ground. It looked like a dead home.”236
lawyers argued this only because the Third Circuit asked them to. Gilhool, UC BERKELEY, supra note
42, at 163.
227. See, e.g., Jane S. Randall, Pennhurst v. Halderman: A Bill of Rights in Name Only, 13 U.
TOL. L. REV. 214, 220 (1981); Ferleger & Maguire, supra note 139, at 331, 338–45.
228. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 33–55 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting in part); Brief for the United States in Opposition, Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1 (No. 81-2101).
229. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Nos. 79-1404, 1408, 1414,
1415 & 1489 – Pennhurst v. Halderman, Mar. 11, 1981, Box 272, Folder 6, THURGOOD MARSHALL
PAPERS (Library of Congress).
230. Id.; see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 421–23 (1970).
231. Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 35 (White, J., dissenting in part).
232. Judith A. Baer, The Burger Court and the Rights of the Handicapped: The Case for Starting
All Over Again, 35 W. POL. Q. 339, 350 (1983).
233. Id. Baer described similarly the Court’s decision in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), in which the Court considered Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 for the first time and adopted an inappropriately narrow view of the statute. Id. at 344–46.
234. David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 595
(1983).
235. Id.
236. Id. Pitts resided in Pennhurst in the mid-1970s. John Woestendiek, Living the Life of Pitts—
at Last, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 17, 1983, at B01.
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Like Pitts, most of the judges on the Third Circuit seemed to have no
interest in giving Pennhurst a second chance at life. Pursuant to the Court’s
remand order, the Third Circuit reconsidered the case and issued a second en
banc decision, reaching the same ultimate conclusion but basing its decision
solely on state law grounds.237 Conveniently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had recently interpreted the state’s Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act,
and its reading of that statute supported the District Court’s 1977 decision.238
Perhaps this long-running litigation would finally expire.
Instead, the defendants once again filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.239
Pennsylvania officials, at least, seem to have done so because they saw an
opportunity to gain further ground in a perceived battle between beleaguered
state officials and an activist federal judiciary. By 1983, this was a battle that
went well beyond institutions like Pennhurst and implicated important aspects of
state governance. In the words of Pennsylvania Secretary of Welfare Walter W.
Cohen, the State aimed to establish whether it was up to federal judges to “decide
what state prisons or mental hospitals . . . or highways should be closed.”240 This
time, the State claimed that the Eleventh Amendment meant the federal courts
should never have even entertained a state law claim against the state.241
In 1983, this argument was dubious. Compared to other provisions of the
Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment looks narrow and technical—not
naturally amenable to novel re-readings.242 In an important case in 1890, the
Supreme Court had given the amendment a more expansive interpretation,
suggesting that it encapsulated the principle of state sovereign immunity.243 But
a host of cases since then had treated that principle as subordinate to other
considerations.244 At the time of the Pennhurst appeal, suits against state officers
were commonplace in federal court, including suits involving state law claims.245
237. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 656–61 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc),
rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
238. Id. at 651–53 (citing In re Schmidt, 429 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981)).
239. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp v. Halderman (Pennhurst II),
465 U.S. 89 (1984) (No. 81-2101).
240. John Woestendiek, Pa. Files Plan to Shut Pennhurst, but Will Pursue Appeal, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 30, 1983, at B06. “By 1984,” according to Margo Schlanger, “24% of the nation’s 903
state prisons (including at least one in each of forty-three states and the District of Columbia) reported
to the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics that they were operating under a court order.” Margo Schlanger,
Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2004
(1999). On prison reform litigation in this period, see generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998); Schlanger, supra note 129.
241. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. 89 (No. 81-2101).
242. The amendment reads: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
243. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13–21 (1890).
244. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 142–68 (1908).
245. On the history of the Eleventh Amendment and the Court’s interpretation of it over time,
see Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, Sovereignties—Federal, State and Tribal: The Story of Seminole
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Indeed, the legal authority appeared so one-sided as to make the defendants’
Eleventh Amendment argument “unique,” in the words of the court of appeals—
an argument “not previously advanced anywhere,” as far as that court could
tell.246
That the Supreme Court would choose to entertain such a claim was, in fact,
no surprise to astute observers of the institution.247 As Professor William
Fletcher noted in 1983, some of the Justices seemed to see in the Eleventh
Amendment a potentially sweeping “jurisdictional bar” against types of suits that
they no longer wanted to see in federal court (namely, private suits against state
governments).248 For these Justices, the Pennhurst litigation was a tempting
vehicle for “litigating abstract federalism and comity issues,” as one of Justice
Blackmun’s law clerks noted.249
Urging on the Court in this case were attorneys general (AGs) from twentytwo states, plus Puerto Rico and American Samoa.250 This was significant in that
state AGs had not previously been particularly coordinated, nor were they known
for strong performances before the Supreme Court (much to the chagrin of some
of the Court’s more conservative Justices).251 By 1982, they had turned things
around.252 They had created within their existing organization (the National
Association of Attorneys General) a dedicated Supreme Court Project. And via
a friendly assist from the Reagan Administration’s Department of Justice, they
enjoyed energetic leadership from attorney-advisor Douglas Ross.253 The
Pennhurst amicus brief reflected these efforts.

Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES 329, 329–37 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik
eds., 2010).
246. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 656 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc),
rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
247. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 457 U.S. 1, 1 (1982) (“Petition for writ of
certiorari . . . granted.”).
248. William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033–34, 1033 n.2 (1983); see also Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1193 n.10 (noting
the Court’s reinvigoration of the Eleventh Amendment in civil rights cases).
249. Letter from HKK to Justice Blackmun, June 15, 1982, Box 391, Folder 1, HARRY A.
BLACKMUN PAPERS (Library of Congress) [hereinafter BLACKMUN PAPERS].
250. Brief of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (No. 81-2101).
251. Douglas Ross & Michael W. Catalano, How State and Local Governments Fared in the
United States Supreme Court for the Past Five Terms, 20 URB. L.J. 341, 341 (1988); John P. MacKenzie,
Editorial, Even Up the Odds at the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1983, at A22.
252. Douglas Ross, Safeguarding Our Federalism: Lessons for the States from the Supreme
Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 723, 727 (1985).
253. Id. On the activity of state attorneys general from the late 1970s forward, see generally
Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae,
70 JUDICATURE 298 (1987); Michael E. Solimine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative
Critique of the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1475–79 (2003); Margaret H. Lemos &
Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General as Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (2015).
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Writing for the majority in Pennhurst II, Justice Powell gave the state AGs
everything they could have hoped for. His opinion characterized the Eleventh
Amendment as representing more than its text: it affirmed “the fundamental
principle of sovereign immunity” and recognized that principle’s firm
constraints on the federal courts’ jurisdictional authority.254 Seen in this light, the
Eleventh Amendment barred the Third Circuit’s most recent actions in the
Pennhurst case (in which they affirmed the District Court’s decision on state law
grounds) and placed the plaintiffs’ case on precarious footing.255
Justice Powell might seem an odd figure to deliver this message, given how
tightly his legacy is now linked to affirmative approaches to addressing
inequality.256 But one of the great themes of Justice Powell’s career was
skepticism of federal court efforts to remedy state and local discrimination. As a
member of the Richmond, Virginia, school board in the era of Brown (he served
from 1952 to 1961) and, subsequently, the state board of education (on which he
sat from 1961 to 1969), Powell believed that federal courts should intrude
minimally into local desegregation efforts.257 After joining the Court, Powell
tried to guide his fellow Justices in this direction, both in cases involving courtordered busing and in ones involving the preclearance requirement of the Voting
Rights Act, which he saw as similarly intrusive.258 Along similar lines, Powell
dissented vigorously in Maine v. Thiboutot, in which the Court expanded its

254. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).
255. Id. at 103–06.
256. Powell famously authored the majority opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
257. See Earl M. Maltz, The Triumph of the Southern Man: Dowell, Shelby County, and the
Jurisprudence of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 173–208
(2019).
258. For Powell’s views on busing, see his opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 217–53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Austin Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). For Powell’s views on the
Voting Rights Act, see, for example, Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 193–206 (1980). These examples come
from Maltz, supra note 257, at 218–25. For other thoughtful discussions of Justice Powell’s views on
racial discrimination and its remediation, see, for example, Anders Walker, A Lawyer Looks at Civil
Disobedience: How Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Reframed the Civil Rights Revolution, 86 U. COLO. L. REV.
1229 passim (2015); Asad Rahim, Diversity to Deradicalize, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1435–57 (2020).
For more on desegregation battles in Richmond, see MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY:
SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2007).
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interpretation of Section 1983259 to allow many more claims against state and
local officials into federal court.260
To Justice Powell, the district court’s actions in Pennhurst offered another
example of federal judicial overreach. “Off the wall!” read one of Powell’s
annotations, on a portion of a bench memo describing Judge Broderick’s order
to close the institution.261 He scrawled a similar notation next to a mention of the
daily fines Broderick imposed on noncompliant state administrators.262
Justice Powell’s formal opinion in Pennhurst II was more restrained. It
calmly walked the reader through a doctrinal thicket, rereading landmark
opinions along the way.263 The most significant was a line of Eleventh
Amendment cases that distinguished a plaintiff’s request for retroactive
monetary relief from the kind of prospective relief at issue in Pennhurst.264 The
Eleventh Amendment barred federal courts from ordering the former, the Court
had held, but not the latter—even when prospective relief would have a
significant impact on a state treasury.265 Powell circumnavigated those cases by
emphasizing the federal nature of the claims at issue there: federal judicial relief
was necessary to vindicate the principle of federal supremacy.266 When the relief
being ordered stemmed from a violation of state law, rather than federal law, that
vital first principle was no longer at issue.267 But what remained in play was the
principle of state sovereignty. “[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on
259. Section 1983 is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In pertinent part, it reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
260. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell’s strong views on
Thiboutot reappear in his notes on Pennhurst I. He acknowledged the case’s precedential authority but
repeatedly referred to it as “erroneous.” 19-1414 Pennhurst Pre-Conference Notes, Box 76, LEWIS F.
POWELL JR. ARCHIVES, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of L., Va. (available at
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1577&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/NNV7-SDZX]) [hereinafter POWELL PAPERS]. “Miserable case!” he scribbled on one
draft opinion that cited it. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, Sup. Ct. Case Files Collection,
Box 76, POWELL PAPERS, supra.
261. Memo, Box 141, POWELL PAPERS, supra note 260.
262. Bench Memo at 2–3, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S.
89 (1984) (No. 81-2010); Box 141, POWELL PAPERS, supra note 260. Justice Powell was not
unsympathetic to the plaintiffs, as evidenced by his majority opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 309–25 (1982) (recognizing, in a case involving a Pennhurst resident, that an individual
involuntarily committed in a non-penal institution had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
reasonable conditions of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints). What he was apparently
averse to was sweeping judicial mandates that required structural change.
263. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 102–03 (1984).
(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 105–06.
267. Id.
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state sovereignty,” Powell wrote, “than when a federal court instructs state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.”268 The other major
precedential obstacle was a long line of cases in which federal courts, exercising
“pendent jurisdiction,” had adjudicated state-law claims against state officials
and ordered relief, without anyone apparently perceiving an Eleventh
Amendment problem.269 Powell treated those cases as irrelevant because there
was no Supreme Court precedent that expressly approved this practice.270
Toward the end of his decision, Justice Powell implicitly recognized what
a significant change he had wrought, noting a potential “disruptive effect” on
ligation against state officials.271 But having found a constitutional defect with
the federal courts’ jurisdiction, the Court need not—indeed, must not—entertain
such “policy” considerations.272 The Court reversed and remanded the case once
more, this time for the Third Circuit to consider whether the district court’s
decision might be sustained on the basis of an alternative, federal law ground.273
This resolution was not as obviously correct as Justice Powell made it out
to be. The U.S. Department of Justice, whose Reagan-appointed leadership had
adopted a relatively conciliatory stance toward state governments, actually
argued in an amicus filing that the Eleventh Amendment was not an obstacle in
this case (even as it withdrew its support for the district court’s remedy).274
Indeed, in his own pre-argument notes, Powell seemed to agree. The district
court’s decision to consider the state law claim squared with his own previously
expressed views on federal court jurisdiction. And although the Eleventh
Amendment was never far from Powell’s mind, he saw a way to avoid it through
the Court’s previously drawn distinction between retroactive and prospective
relief. Powell also seemed to agree with a law clerk about an acute prudential
concern: resolving a case on state law grounds was clearly preferable to federal
judges tackling novel and tricky federal constitutional claims. (“Amen!” Powell
wrote next to his clerk’s observation.)275 That escape route would vanish if the
Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar consideration of state law
claims.276
These privately expressed doubts—about precedents and prudence—shed
light on why Justice Powell’s confident opinion provoked such a sharp dissent
from Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun).

268. Id. at 106.
269. Id. at 117–21.
270. See id. at 120–23.
271. Id. at 121.
272. Id. at 122–23.
273. Id. at 125.
274. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman
(Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (No. 81-2101).
275. Bench Memo at 6, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(No. 81-2010), Box 141, POWELL PAPERS, supra note 260.
276. Id.
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Stevens charged the majority with “repudiat[ing] at least 28 cases, spanning well
over a century of this Court’s jurisprudence,” to find a constitutional violation
where the Court had never spotted one before.277
Justice Stevens also pointed out a great irony: when the Third Circuit
upheld the District Court’s decision on state law grounds, it had “conformed
precisely” to the Supreme Court’s directive in Pennhurst I.278 Now, in an
“unprecedented about-face,” the majority held “that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited the Court of Appeals from doing what this Court ordered it to do when
we instructed it to decide whether respondents were entitled to relief under state
law.”279 “This case has illuminated the character of an institution,” Stevens
famously wrote in the opening lines of his dissent, referring there to Pennhurst.280
He closed his dissent in the same way—with a reference to institutional
“character.”281 This time the referent was an “undisciplined” Supreme Court.282
The majority opinion also drew fierce critiques from academics—“almost
universally hostile,” as one commentator put it.283 Harvard Law Professor David
Shapiro devoted an entire article to the “wrong turns” the Court took in its
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.284 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
noted worrisome doctrinal and practical consequences, including the implication
that litigants with federal and state law claims should simply give up the federal
forum.285 Professor David Rudenstine observed how easily the Court could have
vacated the injunction on non-constitutional grounds.286 Instead, the Court

277. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 126–27 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 130.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 126.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 166–67.
283. George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst: Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment,
and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L.
REV. 343, 351 (1985).
284. David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984). These navigational errors included the Court’s “extension of the eleventh
amendment beyond its terms and its bonding to the doctrine of sovereign immunity” (augmenting an
error in the Court’s much-criticized late-nineteenth-century decision Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890)); “the expansive operational definition” that the Court “accorded the sovereign immunity
defense” (ignoring limitations implied by precedents); and the Court’s “failure to give adequate attention
to state law in determining the availability of that defense” (for instance, to consider whether
Pennsylvania had, in fact, waived it sovereign immunity in the type of case at hand). Id. at 67, 70, 78.
285. The incentives would arguably run that way because for a litigant to bifurcate their claims—
the state claim(s) to state court, the federal claim(s) to federal court—would be costly and could result
in a finding of res judicata as to the federal claim. Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal
Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment after Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643,
658–59 (1985); see also Robert H. Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman: The Eleventh Amendment, Erie and
Pendent State Law Claims, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 271–94 (1985) (playing out different post-Pennhurst
II claim and issue preclusion scenarios and explaining why litigants would feel pressured to bring both
state and federal claims in a state court proceeding).
286. David Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial Power to Reform Social
Institutions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 89 (1984).
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“impose[d] a constitutional restriction on the federal courts’ jurisdiction” and
called into question federal courts’ long-established use of their equitable powers
to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state officers.287 After dutifully
summarizing the case, the leading casebook on Federal Courts asked simply:
“What accounts for the majority’s strained reading and repudiation of so many
precedents?”288 Such responses are a reminder that, at the time, Pennhurst II
represented a major step forward in the Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence.
***
On the ground in Pennsylvania, ironically, the Supreme Court’s decision
did not change much. Pennsylvania officials seemed to understand that
Pennhurst was irredeemable and announced their intention to close it.289 In the
months after Pennhurst II, as the Third Circuit prepared to consider the case for
a third time, the parties entered settlement negotiations.290 In July 1984, when
the parties reached an agreement, only 460 residents remained at Pennhurst.291
The terms of the resulting agreement, which Judge Broderick formally
approved on April 5, 1985, did not differ dramatically from the terms of his
original 1977 order.292 The primary difference was the exclusion from the
plaintiff class of persons who had never actually resided at Pennhurst (the
original class had included people who were on the waiting list and those who
faced the possibility of placement there).293 As to current and former residents,
however, the state made a significant commitment: it promised to continue
providing community services for those individuals who had already transitioned
out of the institution, to provide community placements and services for those
who remained, and to make available sufficient funds to honor these
commitments.294 The proposed rate of community placements would allow for
the closing of Pennhurst by July 1, 1986.295 In short, the settlement agreement
gave the plaintiffs virtually everything they had wanted, albeit over a decade
after they had asked for it.296
Judge Broderick also appeared to view the final settlement agreement as a
victory, despite two Supreme Court reversals that questioned his expansive use

287. Id. He referred specifically to the way the majority treated Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
152 (1908).
288. PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1201 (Found. Press, 3d. ed. 1988).
289. John Woestendiek, State Plans to Close Pennhurst, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 26, 1983, at
A01.
290. Amy Linn, Order to Close Pennhurst Ends Landmark Case, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 6,
1985, at A01.
291. Robert A. Burt, The Judge, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 25, at 362.
292. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1226–34 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1227–29.
295. Id. at 1227.
296. See id. at 1226–29.
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of judicial power.297 “This settlement is more than just a termination of
litigation,” Judge Broderick wrote in the concluding paragraph of his 1985
approval order, “it is the beginning of a new era.”298 It was an era in which people
on various sides of the issue could agree that people with intellectual or
developmental disabilities “have a right to care, education and training in the
community”; that such citizens “are not subjects to be warehoused in
institutions”; and that “they are individuals, the great majority of whom have a
potential to become productive members of society.”299
This is a vital legacy. But there were other legacies, too.
III.
LEGACIES
In the decades after Pennhurst’s closure, as former residents dispersed into
the community, the Supreme Court cases that bore their names lessened the
appeal of federal litigation based on the “right to habilitation” and “right to
treatment.” Advocates of deinstitutionalization perceived the closing of a door,
the end of an era.300 Some followed the arrows to state court, pursuing claims
under “patients’ bill of rights” laws, state constitutional provisions, and other
state law guarantees.301 Some continued to summon federal government
power—just in different ways. They filed individual suits and hoped that these
would spark broader change;302 they encouraged the U.S. Department of Justice
to investigate and prosecute state institutions, using its authority under the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) (1980);303 they lobbied for
297. See id. at 1233–34.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Barbara R. Grumet, The Changing Role of the Federal and State Courts in Safeguarding
the Rights of the Mentally Disabled, 15 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 67, 72–73 (1985).
301. See Katie Eyer, Litigating for Treatment: The Use of State Laws and Constitutions in
Obtaining Treatment Rights for Individuals with Mental Illness, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1,
12–13 (2003) (documenting the different legal bases on which state law right-to-treatment claims have
been predicated). As far as I can tell, existing research has not resolved whether there is “parity” between
state and federal courts when it comes to enforcing the federal rights of disabled plaintiffs. It is also
unclear whether state law, as interpreted by state courts, is a better or worse protector of disabled
plaintiffs than federal law. On state law as a resource, see generally Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions
and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1249 (1987); Eyer, Litigating for Treatment, supra. But see Am. Bar Ass’n, State Courts Slow
Deinstitutionalization, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 98, 98–100 (1987) (documenting
decisions from two state courts limiting their state’s obligations to institutionalized individuals). My
own research on post-Pennhurst II right-to-treatment-type cases in state courts showed neither sweeping
success nor sweeping failure. This research also suggests that any state court findings regarding legal
rights will exist alongside recognition of limited resources.
302. See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that state officials
had denied to the institutionalized plaintiff her “fundamental right to liberty . . . without due process”
and finding the plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief).
303. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349. On
the history of CRIPA and its enforcement, see generally KAREN E. HOLT, WHEN OFFICIALS CLASH:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT (1998). A striking
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statutory and administrative changes that could encourage states to invest in less
restrictive forms of care; and, after 1990, they attempted to leverage the antidiscrimination protections in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).304 To
the extent that these efforts harnessed federal power against the states, however,
they did so less directly and arguably less forcefully than the litigants did in
Pennhurst.305
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s two Pennhurst decisions developed lives
of their own, separate from the deinstitutionalization context. These judicial
legacies helped entrench a changed understanding of the federal government’s
role in articulating and vindicating basic entitlements—not only for Americans
with developmental and intellectual disabilities, but for the much wider set of
Americans that have relied on federal power to secure material and dignitary
support.
A. Constraining the Rights-Giving Congress
Consider first the clear statement rule articulated in Pennhurst I. This canon
of statutory interpretation intervened in a long-running debate over the use of
federal resources (i.e., the exercise of the Spending Power) to secure cooperation
from state governments. The stakes of this debate seemed to grow higher every
year, as the number of federal-state grant-in-aid programs multiplied and public
expectations of government grew. In the words of one concerned commentator,
there was a veritable “explosion” of such grants in the 1960s and 1970s; their
share of the Gross National Product went from 0.1 percent in 1929, to 1.1 percent
in 1939 (as the New Deal expanded their use), to 3.6 percent in 1978.306 These
grants brought with them power—including the power to impact citizens’ lives
in meaningful ways—but also costs, burdens, and uncertainties.307 They also
sometimes created hopes or demands that states and localities were not able or
willing to fulfill, thereby sparking sharp conflicts.

finding throughout the book is how much CRIPA enforcement has depended on the preferences of
whoever controls the executive branch. See id.; see also Robert D. Dinerstein, The Absence of Justice,
63 NEB. L. REV. 680, 681–82, 692–707 (1984) (demonstrating that the Reagan Administration
significantly cut back on CRIPA enforcement, bringing virtually no new cases under CRIPA); Interview
with Arthur Peabody (Jan. 19, 2021).
304. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593–94 (1999). For an excellent
overview of this “second . . . wave of deinstitutionalization litigation,” as well as an analysis of the
political forces that are likely to shape its trajectory, see Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 1, 31–51.
305. A notable example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead, 527 U.S. Although the
case was an important victory for disability rights and is rightly celebrated for the more inclusive future
it might yet help produce, the decision also tethers disability rights to a number of external factors,
including state resources. 527 U.S. at 607; Interview with Steve Gold (Jul. 30, 2019).
306. Bruce J. Casino, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Evolution, Crisis, and Future, 20 URB. L. 25, 32
(1988).
307. See John E. Chubb, Federalism and the Bias for Centralization, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 273 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (documenting these concerns).
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Over time, the Pennhurst I clear statement rule had the effect that
conservative lawyer Michael McConnell predicted, albeit not in every instance
that defendants raised it. The myth remained “that Congress could ‘do anything’
under its power to tax and appropriate,” to borrow legal historian Michele Landis
Dauber’s words.308 But in practice, the clear statement rule limited the scope and
effectiveness of some Spending Clause statutes.309 This Section begins with two
examples from the 1980s to make the point that lower federal courts did take
note of Pennhurst I and that the clear statement rule had real consequences for
some of the populations Congress intended to benefit. I then review the rule’s
implications for federally guaranteed civil rights and government-funded health
insurance.
Pennhurst I’s clear statement rule is what Professor Stephen Ross has
called a “normative canon”: it expresses a “principle[] . . . that do[es] not purport
to describe accurately what Congress actually intended or what the words of a
statute mean, but rather direct[s] courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular
way in order to further some policy objective.”310 The principle at the heart of
Pennhurst I’s clear statement rule is solicitude for the states—a principle that the
Court cast as so deeply rooted that there would be no unfairness, going forward,
for the new clear statement rule to apply to any number of other statutes that
were drafted before Congress had formally heard of the rule.
Consider, for example, the narrowing of the Adoptive Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 in the 1989 case Aristotle v. Johnson out of the Northern
District of Illinois.311 The statute made available payments to states with an
approved foster care and adoption assistance plan.312 One “requisite feature” of
a state plan was that it provide for “reasonable efforts to reunify families.”313
Another was that it “provide for a case review system” designed around the goal

308. Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 390 (2005)
(quoting Justice Harlan F. Stone).
309. Terry Jean Seligmann has illustrated this trend well, with an article that sweeps broadly but
also delves deeply into the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act. See generally Seligmann, supra note 9. For a brisk discussion of the development of the clear
statement rule and a thorough review and evaluation of the various rationales that have been offered for
it, see generally Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear
Thinking about Conditional Grants on Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 (2004). For a particular
focus on the clear statement rule in the Roberts Court era (albeit one written pre-NFIB v. Sebelius), see
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 394–95
(2008).
310. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely
Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992).
311. 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1011–12 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Judge Williams did not treat the plaintiffs in
this case as entirely without remedy. In denying, in part, the defendant State’s motion to dismiss, Judge
Williams noted “the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right to associate with their siblings” and made
clear that infringements of this right should be “evaluated under a heightened level of scrutiny.” Id. at
1006.
312. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500.
313. Id.
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of placement “in the least restrictive, most family like setting.”314 The plaintiff
children alleged that the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
accepted federal funds but disregarded plan requirements—for example, by
separating them from their siblings and refusing to arrange sibling visits.315 The
court, citing Pennhurst I, deemed these plan requirements unenforceable.316 In
Judge Ann Williams’s view, the statutory language was “amorphous and not
subject to precise definition”; “Congress did not ‘unambiguously’ express its
intent to condition the grant of federal funds on the state’s compliance” with
those particular terms.317
The D.C. Circuit reached a similar decision in the 1987 case Edwards v.
District of Columbia, involving the United States Housing Act of 1937 (as
amended in 1983).318 The case began when a group of current and former
residents of a federally funded housing project, Fort Dupont, alleged
“constructive demolition” of that complex, via a pattern of neglect and
abandonment by the local housing authority.319 The plaintiffs characterized these
actions as inconsistent with the United States Housing Act, which set forth
specific conditions upon which the Secretary of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) could approve demolition.320 The plaintiffs
emphasized that the local housing authority had yet to receive HUD approval at
the time it abandoned their home.321 The circuit court affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint, relying heavily on Pennhurst I.322 Chief Judge Patricia Wald’s
majority opinion characterized the housing authority’s alleged circumvention of
the prescribed process as perhaps “insensitive,” but not so clearly prohibited by
the statute as to give the housing authority fair notice that acceptance of federal
funds might carry with it a duty not to do what it did.323
The dissent from Senior District Court Judge Hubert Louis Will, sitting by
designation, illuminates the stakes of this interpretive canon. Having entered the
legal profession as a “New Deal lawyer” and joined the judiciary under President
Kennedy, Judge Will was likely accustomed to a more generous approach to
Congress’s handiwork and struggled with Pennhurst I (or at least Judge Wald’s
314. Id.
315. Aristotle, 721 F. Supp. at 1004.
316. Id. at 1003–12.
317. Id. at 1012 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1,
17, 24–25 (1981)).
318. 821 F.2d 651, 662–63 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
319. Id. at 654.
320. Id. at 652–54.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 652–63.
323. Id. at 660. As Chief Judge Wald had recognized several years earlier in a law review article
about the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation, a “popular presumption” on the Court
was that “Congress did not intend to interfere with the traditional power and authority of the states unless
it signaled its intention in neon lights.” Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 208 (1983). Although the Edwards
case involved a local government, not a state government, she apparently applied this same presumption.
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reading of it).324 Looking at the statute in question, its legislative history, and
HUD’s implementing regulations, he found a clear intention not to allow
“destruction of a housing project without prior approval.”325 The court now
invited local housing authorities to do just that, he alleged, with potentially tragic
implications for “the available supply of low-income housing” and “the plight of
our nation’s homeless and impoverished citizens.”326
Edwards v. District of Columbia led promptly to a congressional
override,327 but in other instances, Congress could not or would not pay the
“clarity tax”328 that the clear statement rule imposed (or perhaps simply did not
object to courts’ clear statement holdings). One notable example is Arlington
Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, in which the Supreme
Court applied Pennhurst I’s clear statement rule in a way that narrowed the
potential damages available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act.329 Another is Gregory v. Ashcroft, which limited the reach of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (and is noteworthy for extending Pennhurst
I outside the grant-in-aid context).330
To be sure, these examples represent only a small fraction of the statutes
governing American life at the end of the twentieth century. That some of their
terms became less enforceable or unenforceable in private lawsuits mattered
greatly to those statutes’ beneficiaries, but what about the broader legal
landscape?
Most consequentially, Pennhurst I’s clear statement rule has affected the
reach of what Professor Joy Milligan has called “Spending Clause civil rights”
guarantees: anti-discrimination laws that use as their “hook” a potential
discriminator’s reliance on federal funds.331 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is a prominent example. Two others are Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (dealing with sex-based discrimination) and Section 504

324. See Hubert Louis Will Profile, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/1389801
[https://perma.cc/M5QR-NYJL].
325. Edwards, 821 F.2d at 670.
326. Id.
327. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat.
1815 (clarifying local housing authorities’ duties not to constructively demolish public housing). For
another example of this pattern, see Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560–61
(4th Cir. 1997).
328. Manning, supra note 9, at 399; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 639 (explaining
how difficult it can be to override a Supreme Court statutory decision).
329. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296–304 (2006) (applying
the rule developed in Pennhurst I to find that the IDEA did not put states on notice of their potential
liability for expert-services fees in private enforcement actions).
330. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455–73 (1991). These citations should not be read
to suggest that “clear statement” arguments have always worked for the litigants who raised them. For
counterexamples, see Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246–48 (2009); Madison v.
Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 124–26 (4th Cir. 2006); Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 611
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
331. Milligan, supra note 10, at 6.
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of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (regarding disability). Importantly, these antidiscrimination mandates go well beyond specific programs. In the case of Title
VI and Section 504, they reach all recipients of federal funds. In the case of Title
IX, they reach all educational activities or programs that receive federal funds.332
Immediately after the Supreme Court decided Pennhurst I, there were
ripple effects in the realm of Spending Clause civil rights. Consider, for example,
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lieberman v. University of Chicago (1981).
Plaintiff Judy Lieberman claimed that, because of her sex, she was not awarded
a place at the University of Chicago’s Pritzker School of Medicine, which was
near where she and her husband lived.333 Ultimately, she accepted a spot at
Harvard Medical School.334 Lieberman alleged violation of Title IX and sought
compensatory damages, including for moving expenses and loss of
consortium.335 Citing Pennhurst I, the court concluded that Title IX did not
explicitly create a damages remedy and therefore institutions like the defendant
were not on notice of how their acceptance of federal funds might trigger this
potential liability.336 Lieberman remained free to seek injunctive or declaratory
relief under the statute, but the institution that allegedly wronged her could not
be held responsible for the material consequences of its actions.337 Dissenting
Judge Luther Meritt Swygert labeled the decision “an evisceration” of Title IX’s
ban against sex discrimination.338
Just over a decade later, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the
Supreme Court clarified that in some Title IX cases—those involving allegations
of intentional discrimination—monetary damages were available.339 But,
building on its fractured opinion in the Title VI case Guardians v. Civil Service
Commission,340 the Court strongly suggested that the clear statement rule from
Pennhurst I would pose a problem if the alleged conduct was not intentionally
discriminatory.341 In such situations, the defendant funding recipient may not
have contemplated liability for monetary damages.342

332. 660 F.2d 1185, 1186–89 (7th Cir. 1981).
333. Id. at 1186.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1186–89.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1189 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
339. 503 U.S. 60, 62 (1991).
340. The Court drew here on its fractured 1983 decision Guardians v. Civil Service Commission,
which involved a claim under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and a factual situation that sounded
in disparate impact rather than intentional discrimination. See Guardians v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 463
U.S. 582, 584–89 (1983). Justice White’s controlling opinion cited Pennhurst I for the proposition that
“‘make whole’ remedies” (such as money damages) “are not ordinarily appropriate in private actions
seeking relief for violations of” Spending Clause statutes because such remedies might represent
“unanticipated burdens” not obvious to a state at the time they accepted federal funds. Id. at 596.
341. See Gwinnett, 503 U.S. at 73–74.
342. Id.
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The Supreme Court addressed Title VI more squarely in 2002, in the police
misconduct case Barnes v. Gorman, and again used the logic of Pennhurst I to
impose limits.343 The case involved serious injuries to a paraplegic man in police
custody and claims under Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.344 The legal question was whether punitive damages—here,
a $1.2 million jury award—were available in suits brought under Title VI (which
would, in turn, decide the question for the ADA and Section 504).345 Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia answered “no.”346 Pennhurst I said that federal-state
grants-in-aid were akin to a contract, Scalia explained, and liability for punitive
damages for Title VI violations was simply not part of the bargain that federal
funding recipients agreed to when they accepted federal money.347 Concurring
only in the judgment, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer)
wrote separately to warn of the Court’s “particularly inappropriate” “reliance on,
and extension of Pennhurst,” and also to dispute whether “the rules of contract
law” were “necessarily relevant to the tortious conduct” at issue.348 “The Court's
novel reliance on what has been, at most, a useful analogy to contract law has
potentially far-reaching consequences that go well beyond the issues briefed and
argued in this case,” Justice Stevens warned.349
The Court’s approach to the Spending Clause civil rights case Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.,350 from the 2021-22 Term, bears out Justice
Stevens’s warnings. Described by her lawyers as “deaf since birth” and “legally
blind,” Cummings alleged that a Texas-based physical therapy provider violated
her rights under Section 504, as well as the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (ACA), when it refused to provide her with an American Sign
Language interpreter at her sessions.351 She sought compensation for

343. 536 U.S. 181, 185–90 (2002). Scholars have recognized this line of reasoning as a significant
elaboration of Pennhurst I, turning what had been an analogy to contract into an implied assumption
that grants-in-aid were, in fact, contracts, to be governed by contract law principles of interpretation. See
id. (reasoning that “punitive damages . . . are generally not available for breach of contract”). For an
elaboration of the “contract thesis” of the spending power, see David Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of
the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496 (2007).
344. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 183–90.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 188. Lower courts continue to struggle with what exactly this line of cases means for
Section 504, posing problems for all of the parties that this law affects. The most recent American Law
Reports commentary on the availability of damages under Section 504 describes the issue as “an
extremely contentious one, with many disagreements between the circuits” and with six of the circuits
reporting intra-circuit disagreement on the issue. John A. Bourdeau, Annotation, Availability of
Damages Under § 504 of Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 794) in Actions Against Persons or Entities
Other than Federal Government or Agencies Thereof, 145 Am. L. Reps. Fed. 353 (1998).
348. 536 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., concurring).
349. Id. at 192–93.
350. Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., No. 20-219, 596 U.S. __ (2022) (available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-219_1b82.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MRK-XEPY]).
351. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., No. 20-219 (U.S.
Aug.
23,
2021)
(available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-
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“humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress.”352 Tellingly, the oral argument
revolved around the notion of a “contract” between the federal government and
its grantee—an idea borrowed directly from Pennhurst I.353 Indeed, the contract
analogy has now become so firmly embedded in the Court’s Spending Clause
jurisprudence that contract law, rather than Congress’s equality mandates,
dominated the discussion.354
Chief Justice John Roberts, who clerked for Justice Rehnquist at the time
of Pennhurst I, wrote the Court’s opinion in favor of the physical therapy
provider—and devoted the opinion’s first citation to Pennhurst I.355 The opinion
went on to find that compensatory damages for emotional distress were not
available under existing Spending Clause civil rights statutes because, following
the logic of Barnes, there was “no basis in contract law to maintain that
emotional distress damages are ‘traditionally available in suits for breach of
contract’” and therefore “no ground” to conclude that recipients of federal funds
had “clear notice” that they might be on the hook for such damages.356
It was an odd opinion in that the majority insisted that contract was just an
analogy—a position reminiscent of Justice Stevens’s warning in Barnes—while
simultaneously relying heavily on contract law treatises, contract law
Restatement provisions, and contract law scholarship. Here, the just-an-analogy
position served to make available “general" or “normal” contract law principles
while removing from consideration finer-grained readings of contract law that
supported the availability of emotional distress damages in certain contexts. As
Chief Justice Roberts explained elsewhere in the opinion, the Court was only
really interested in contract law principles that might limit the liability of federal
funding recipients.357
Cases like Barnes and Cummings may seem relatively insignificant,
especially to people who are inclined to see the disabled plaintiffs’ experiences
219/188259/20210823125207944_20-219ts-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZB5-MTCN]). She also sought
injunctive relief. Id. at 11.
352. Id.
353. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., No. 20219, 596 U.S. __ (2022) (available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2021/20-219_h3dj.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UPQ-QV43]).
354. The word “contract” (or a variation thereof) appears ninety-seven times in the eighty-ninepage transcript of the oral argument. See id.
355. Cummings, 596 U.S., slip op. at 1.
356. Id. at 2 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002)).
357. Id. at 10 (“[O]ur cases do not treat suits under Spending Clause legislation as literal ‘suits in
contract’ . . . . Rather . . . we employ the contract analogy ‘only as a potential limitation on liability’
compared to that which ‘would exist under nonspending statutes.’”) (quoting Sossamon v. Texas, 563
U.S. 277, 290 (2011)). This awkward parsing of contract law appears to have motivated Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Recognizing that the majority opinion and the
dissent were both able to draw persuasively on contract law, Justice Kavanaugh urged the Court to
instead return to first principles (chiefly separation of powers) and treat emotional distress damages as a
matter for Congress to speak upon directly, if it so chose. He suggested that the Court had gone far
enough with “implied causes of action” and should insist on getting additional guidance before venturing
further. Id. at 1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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in these cases as marginal or exceptional, but together they reveal an important
pattern. Spending Clause civil rights statutes have historically been a crucial tool
to combat discrimination; the clear statement rule and the contract analogy used
to explain that rule have allowed accused discriminators to elude responsibility,
or at least to significantly lower the cost of discriminating. As Justice Breyer
noted in his dissent in Cummings, such a result is “difficult to square . . . with
the basic purposes that antidiscrimination laws seek to serve.”358
Pennhurst I’s most famous (and yet still underappreciated) legacy,
however, is surely the Spending Power limitation that Chief Justice Roberts
articulated in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius
(2012), a landmark case involving the constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act.359
NFIB v. Sebelius upheld key provisions of the ACA but struck down the
“Medicaid expansion,” the provision requiring the states to expand their
Medicaid programs by 2014 to cover all low-income Americans under the age
of sixty-five or risk losing all of their existing Medicaid funding.360 “As we have
explained,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, quoting Pennhurst I, “though Congress’
power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it does not include
surprising participating States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’
conditions.”361
Chief Justice Roberts also cited Pennhurst I and its progeny for
observations about the system of dual sovereignty that the Framers established
and the potential of Spending Clause legislation to “undermine the status of the
States” in that system.362 From this vantage point, the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion looked alarming—fatally so.363 Chief Justice Roberts likened it to one
sovereign (the federal government) holding “a gun to the head” of the other (the
states).364 And thus for the first time in Spending Clause history, noted Professor
Lynn Baker, the Court invalidated an “offer of federal funds to the States on the
ground that it was unconstitutionally coercive.”365
Concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice Ginsburg
took special note of Chief Justice Roberts’s use of Pennhurst I.366 Crucial to the
majority’s holding regarding the Medicaid expansion was “the notion that States
must be able to foresee, when they sign up, alterations Congress might make

358. Id. at 10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
359. See 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010).
360. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 584.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 577.
363. Id. at 577–81.
364. Id. at 581.
365. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
71, 73 (2014).
366. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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later on”; Pennhurst I was the “only” case the Chief Justice cited for that
proposition, Ginsburg observed.367
The stakes of NFIB v. Sebelius were high. As of the time of this writing, in
the midst of a public health crisis, twelve states have declined to expand their
Medicaid programs, stranding more than two million people in a healthcare
“coverage gap.”368 The decision has also disadvantaged an additional 1.8 million
uninsured, low-income adults who are currently eligible for marketplace
coverage but who, under the expansion, would be eligible for the more
comprehensive and less costly benefits that Medicaid offers.369 Outside the
healthcare context, meanwhile, NFIB v. Sebelius has emboldened critics of
government regulations, such as states and industry groups that feel unfairly
burdened by the Clean Air Act370 and federal education funding conditions.371
They have not yet succeeded in their legal challenges, but, if history is any guide,
they are not wrong to discern seeds of possibility in this landmark decision.372
These developments reinforce one of this Article’s core claims: that from
Pennhurst I’s seemingly limited principle of statutory interpretation, there
emerged a powerful justification for a more general cabining of the Spending
Power. This is no small development: historically, distributions of federal funds
have been a crucial vehicle for protecting civil rights and advancing the general
welfare.373 This vehicle became even more important as the Supreme Court
placed greater limits on Congress’s power under two other major grants of

367. Id. Ginsburg conceded that Pennhurst I was a relevant precedent, but she interpreted it
differently. In her view, there was no “clear statement” problem because the disputed provision was not
set to go into effect until several years after the ACA’s enactment, giving states ample time to consider
their choices and withdraw from the Medicaid program if they were no longer amenable to federal
conditions. Id. at 637–38.
368. Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor
Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-donot-expand-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/DJ5H-ZWW4].
369. Id. Congress could, of course, devise a different scheme for meeting the population’s
healthcare needs. But given congressional gridlock and the forces arrayed against universal, nationally
administered healthcare, the framework of the ACA appears likely to govern this field for the foreseeable
future.
370. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 182–83 (2013); Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v.
EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 144–86 (2015).
371. See, e.g., Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123257, at *2–5 (M.D. La.
2015).
372. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577 (2013); Sarah Buckley, Note, Clean Air Post-Healthcare: The
Federalism Limits of the Spending Power and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 101 VA. L. REV.
807 (2015).
373. On the importance of federal-state grants-in-aid as a national policymaking device,
historically and in the twenty-first century, see DERTHICK, supra note 10; JOHNSON, supra note 10;
Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011); Jessica Bulman–Pozen, From
Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123
YALE L.J. 1920 (2015); TANI, supra note 95.
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authority, the Fourteenth Amendment374 and the Commerce Clause.375 It is a
weaker vehicle now.
B. Insulating the States from Accountability
Pennhurst II (1984) also turned out to be a crucial step in the court-led
realignment of federal and state power. Directly in its wake came Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon (1985), in which the Court held that the Rehabilitation
Act did not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.376 In the
face of less-than-clear congressional language, the Court protected “the
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity” that Pennhurst II had
articulated.377 The 1989 case Dellmuth v. Muth produced a similar conclusion
regarding the 1975 Education of the Handicapped Act378—despite a 1986 statute
indicating that Congress had overruled Atascadero and, further, that it intended
to abrogate state immunity for suits brought under this statute.379
In giving such strong constitutional grounding to the principle of state
sovereign immunity, Pennhurst II also paved the way for the better-known state
sovereignty cases of the 1990s. A key example is Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, in which the Supreme Court sharply circumscribed Congress’s ability
to create a private federal cause of action against a state for the violation of a
federal right.380 Previous cases had suggested that Congress could do so
whenever it was legislating for a constitutionally authorized purpose, so long as
it clearly stated its intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity.381 Writing for
the majority in Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist changed course,
characterizing as valid only those private federal causes of action that could be
linked to Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment.382
As with Pennhurst II, the dissents were sharp and vigorous. But the conservative
majority’s interpretation of state sovereign immunity was becoming ever more
entrenched.
Alden v. Maine (1999), involving an allegation that Maine violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act in its treatment of state probation officers, continued that

374. See Galle, supra note 309, at 158 (“[R]ecent cut-backs in Congress’s ability to use its power
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact constitutionally-inspired legislation broader
than what the Supreme Court has been willing to recognize place increasing weight on the Spending
Clause--the best available avenue for reinvigorating the Constitution in the states.”).
375. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–68 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 601–27 (2000).
376. 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985).
377. Id. at 238 (quoting Pennhurst II).
378. On the terminology used in this statute, see supra text accompanying note 119.
379. 491 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1989). Congress subsequently overrode Dellmuth, but the fact that it
had to do so demonstrates the power of the Pennhurst II clear statement rule. Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 9, at 639.
380. 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
381. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5–14 (1989).
382. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
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trend: the Court’s conservative majority extended the holding in Seminole Tribe
to actions against states in state court.383 Along with other cases that term, Alden
famously prompted Justice Stevens to compare the Court’s emergent sovereign
immunity jurisprudence to “a mindless dragon that indiscriminately chews
gaping holes in Federal statutes.”384
Pennhurst II was crucial to the dragon’s growth. As Professor William
Baude has explained, Alden v. Maine can only be justified if the principle of
sovereign immunity enjoys some kind of constitutional protection (i.e., it is more
than just common law) but receives that protection somewhere other than the
Eleventh Amendment (which would have no bearing on a suit in state court).385
Pennhurst II, though an Eleventh Amendment case, invited this interpretation by
characterizing sovereign immunity as bigger than any single constitutional
provision.386 It was a “fundamental principle,” the Court explained in Pennhurst
II, with a “vital role . . . in our federal system.”387
By the early 2000s,388 the Court recognized only one circumstance in which
Congress could hale a non-consenting state into federal court: where Congress
was exercising its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.389
Other Rehnquist Court decisions, meanwhile, made clear that Congress’s
Section Five power had limits.390 Indeed, in the wake of these decisions, the
Court rejected two major congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign

383. 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999).
384. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; Federalism; States Are Given New Legal Shield by
the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/24/us/thesupreme-court-federalism-states-are-given-new-legal-shield-by-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/63VC-WJVA].
385. William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 15–17
(2017). Baude described sovereign immunity as a “constitutional ‘backdrop,’” id. at 3, invoking the
work of Steven Sachs. See id. at 3; Steven E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1813, 1816 (2012) (identifying as “constitutional ‘backdrops’” those “rules of law that aren’t derivable
from the Constitution’s text, but . . . are left unaltered by the text, and in fact are protected by the text
from various kinds of legal change”).
386. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 98–99 (1984).
387. Id.; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 728, 757 (citing Pennhurst II for the proposition that
“sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original
Constitution itself” and for the idea that “the principle of sovereign immunity . . . strikes the proper
balance between the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States”); Sossamon
v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (citing Pennhurst II for the proposition that “[s]overeign immunity
principles enforce an important constitutional limitation on the power of the federal courts”).
388. Fed. Mar. Comm’n (FMC) v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002).
389. Stephen I. Vladeck, State Sovereign Immunity and the Roberts Court, 5 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 99, 102 (2010).
390. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516–36 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 was unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments because it
exceeded Congress’s power under Section Five).
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immunity, for purposes of combating age discrimination and disability
discrimination.391
In short, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the Court’s sovereign
immunity jurisprudence had combined with its Section Five jurisprudence to
give states a thick layer of insulation from accountability in federal court.392
Other doctrinal trends, in areas such as standing and pleading, added to the
effect.393 Americans who believed that states were violating their federally
guaranteed rights could still sue state officials (under what remained of the
doctrine of Ex parte Young).394 But the state itself—and importantly, its
treasury—was increasingly difficult to reach.395
***
Taken each on their own terms, the legacies of Pennhurst I and Pennhurst
II are noteworthy; taken together, they are striking. They remind us that only
fifty years ago, the federal government had a relatively robust set of tools for
elaborating the promise of the Reconstruction Amendments—the promise of a
more inclusive society, a more egalitarian democracy, a less exploitative
economy. As the 1960s drew to a close, Congress had an important tool in its
ability to spend federal money, and to place conditions on the money it gave out.
The federal judiciary, for its part, appeared more available than ever before to
aggrieved individuals, especially those seeking to hold state and local officials
to account. The Pennhurst cases show us how, in a piecemeal fashion, powerful
legal and political actors succeeded in narrowing the federal government’s scope
of action.
IV.
RESTORING DISABILITY CONTEXT
This Article does not advance a “but for” argument—that without the
Pennhurst litigation, the Court never would have articulated these doctrines.
Given the composition of the Court in the 1980s, the popular perceptions of
391. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
392. Under the Court’s current sovereign immunity jurisprudence, Congress retains the power to
abrogate States’ sovereign immunity and also to incentivize states to waive sovereign immunity (such
as through Spending Clause statutes). See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–30
(2003). But, building on the same principles that undergird the clear statement rule, such interferences
are valid only where Congress’s intent to abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity is “unequivocally
expressed.” Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2010). Moreover, even where a State has waived
its immunity, the Court will not allow a plaintiff to recover money damages unless a State has expressly
consented to this form of relief, a phenomenon that Professor Aaron Tang has labeled “double
immunity.” Aaron Tang, Double Immunity, 65 STAN. L. REV. 279 passim (2013).
393. See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT:
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017).
394. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 152 (1908).
395. Litigants may sue state officials in their personal capacity for damages, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, but in doing so face other hurdles, including qualified immunity.
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resource scarcity, and the powerful forces pushing for a more conservative
approach to federal judicial enforcement of civil rights, it is entirely possible—
even likely—that absent the Pennhurst case, the Burger or Rehnquist Court still
would have articulated something like the clear statement rule in the cooperative
federalism context. It still would have advanced a more expansive interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity. Some other legal
controversy would have been the vehicle.
But to acknowledge this likelihood does not change historical facts:
Pennhurst was the vehicle. Can we extract any additional meaning from this—
from recoupling the Pennhurst doctrines with the case’s original context?
Reflecting on why the Supreme Court first agreed to hear Pennhurst, and
canvassing Supreme Court case law more generally, I think we might.396
A. “Extreme” and “Expensive” Equality
Crucial to the Justices’ interest in the Pennhurst case, in my reading, was
that it was both the same as and different from legal controversies they had seen
before. It was the same in that the lower court judge had responded to a demand
for equality and inclusion with a broad remedial decree. That decree required a
major restructuring of the status quo at the local level and had significant
implications for state finances. It therefore raised at least some Justices’ hackles.
Pennhurst was different in that the rights at issue seemed more tenuous or more
costly (or perhaps more tenuous because they seemed so costly) than the rights
at issue in other cases implicating equality and inclusion. This made the district
court’s order seem like even more of an imposition than similar orders from other
contexts (e.g., busing).
This cost or burden narrative is one that runs across disability law cases and
that disabled Americans have routinely encountered in their efforts to secure
equal opportunity.397 And that narrative clearly mattered in this case, despite
mounting evidence that deinstitutionalization was more economical than
institutionalization and was, indeed, the policy preference of a growing number
of states.398 Explaining to Justice Stevens why the first Pennhurst appeal might
warrant a grant of certiorari, one of Stevens’s law clerks underscored cost.399 The
relief that the district court ordered was “very expensive,” and the clerk seemed

396. My point here is not that the Supreme Court treated disabled litigants differently from other
similarly situated litigants—although other scholars have persuasively made that argument. See, e.g.,
Anita Silvers, Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and Employment
Discrimination at the Rehnquist Court, 75 MISS. L.J. 945 (2006). It is that cases involving disabled
litigants enabled or invited statements about the law that perhaps would not have been so easily made in
cases involving non-disabled litigants.
397. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA Amendments
Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 207 (2012).
398. Bagenstos, The Past & Future, supra note 6, at 20–21.
399. Box 178, JOHN PAUL STEVENS PAPERS (Library of Congress) [hereinafter STEVENS
PAPERS].
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incredulous that the rights of the Pennhurst plaintiffs required it.400
Appropriations under the DD Act were $75 million in 1981 ($214.7 million in
2020 dollars), which the clerk translated into “minimal funds” from the states’
perspective.401 The clerk doubted that a state would actually take those funds if
it understood that Congress intended to require deinstitutionalization as a
condition of receipt; this, in turn, made it doubtful that Congress intended to
impose such a requirement.402 A law clerk to Justice Powell raised the same
concerns. Analyzing whether Congress could have intended to require
habilitation in the “least restrictive” setting and, if so, whether that intention
would support the district court’s order, the clerk characterized the remedy as
“extreme.”403
Justice White’s memo to the Court, suggesting the questions on which cert
should be granted, framed the appeal similarly. “[A]t the core of the dispute” was
whether the DD Act required a state “to create and fund” community-based
treatment facilities for the statute’s intended beneficiaries “irrespective of cost,
available resources, or state policy” and whether affected individuals were
allowed to enforce such a requirement via private litigation.404 The lower courts’
answers to these questions had “far-reaching policy implications for States,”
White concluded, making them worthy of the Court’s time.405
The eleven states that filed an amicus brief in support of the defendants
stressed this point and suggested cost implications extending well beyond their
disabled citizens. Quoting the Court’s recent abortion-funding decision, Harris
v. McRae,406 and shifting the focus of Pennhurst subtly from governmentenforced segregation and maltreatment to government-funded liberty, the states
asked what would happen “if the developmentally disabled may be ‘confer(red)
an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize the advantages of . . .
freedom’”?407 Their answer: “all other disadvantaged citizens should have such
an entitlement as well.”408 Besides causing “chao[s]” on the ground, this would
be a deep affront to the states.409

400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. The clerk did not note how the Reagan Administration’s budget-cutting efforts might
have affected appropriations.
403. Paul Shechtman, Supp. Memorandum, Box 76, POWELL PAPERS, supra note 260 (quoting
marginalia by Mary Ellen Richey).
404. Justice Byron R. White to the Conference, Re: Nos. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1414, 79-1415
& 79-1489 – Pennhurst State School & Hospital, etc., June 4, 1980, in Folder 327, BLACKMUN PAPERS,
supra note 248. The vote to grant cert was 8 to 1, with only Justice Stewart voting against. Box 178,
STEVENS PAPERS, supra note 399.
405. Id.
406. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
407. Brief of Illinois, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (No. 79-1404).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 37.

2022]

THE PENNHURST DOCTRINES

1213

The idea of expenses as affronts illuminates another facet of the cost
narrative. Conversations about cost are also often conversations about value—
about whether the thing associated with the cost is “worth it.” Where the answer
is yes, cost narratives have less purchase. Consider, for example, the equal
protection case Plyler v. Doe (1982), involving the exclusion from a Texas
school district of children who could not prove their legal entitlement to live in
the United States.410 The Court dismissed out of hand Texas’s arguments about
fiscal burden, characterizing the alleged costs as unsubstantiated and, in any
event, “insubstantial” when compared to the interests at stake.411 The plaintiff
children were “innocent” and fully educable, capable of becoming productive
members of society.412 Denied their rights, they would experience the “enduring
disability” of illiteracy, followed by “lifetime hardship” and “stigma.”413 The
Court went on to strike down the Texas statute at issue.414
Different judgments about value flow beneath the surface of Pennhurst,
making available different legal arguments. As the Court noted in the opening of
its opinion in Pennhurst I, 75 percent of Pennhurst residents were “either
‘severely’ or ‘profoundly’ retarded—that is, with an IQ of less than 35”—and
some also had physical impairments.415 There was no mention of their innocence
or promise. In Pennhurst II, the Pennhurst residents were almost completely
absent from the Court’s opinion, although there was discussion of the “plight
of . . . the mental institutions,” which had long been “underfunded and
understaffed.”416
My point is not that the Court should have denied cert in Pennhurst or that
it was illegitimate for the defendants and their amici to raise concerns about cost
and value. It is to note how readily the Justices seemed to accept this narrative
of too-expensive rights—a narrative that might have felt unseemly or
inappropriate in a different (non-disability) equality context. And once the Court
had accepted the case, it was free to make major, trans-substantive
pronouncements about the states’ sovereignty and dignity.
B. Judicial Restraint in the Face of Discrimination
Broadening out from Pennhurst, we see that ideas about intellectual and
developmental disability appear elsewhere in Supreme Court case law, often in
410. 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
411. Id. at 227–30.
412. Id. at 223–24.
413. Id. at 222–24.
414. Id. at 230.
415. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1981). As
readers at the time would likely have recognized, an IQ score of thirty-five is significantly below the
“average” score of one hundred. I include the word “retarded” here because the Court clearly found
meaning in it. At the time of the litigation, this word functioned as a clinical judgment about the nature
and degree of an individual’s intellectual or developmental impairment. I acknowledge the term’s
current offensiveness and do not wish to perpetuate its use.
416. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 108 n.16 (1984).
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ways that suggest the need to place boundaries and limits on equality principles.
Consider the opening lines of former Solicitor General John W. Davis’s
argument before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, as he
pleaded the case of the Clarendon County, South Carolina school board:
I think if the appellants’ construction of the Fourteenth Amendment
should prevail here, there is no doubt in my mind that it would catch the
Indian within its grasp just as much as the Negro. If it should prevail, I
am unable to see why a state would have any further right to segregate
its pupils on the ground of sex or on the ground of age or on the ground
of mental capacity.417
These non-racial segregations—of different sexes, ages, and mental
capacities—were obviously valid, Davis implied, and thus signaled states’ right
to segregate on the basis of race, too.418 “If [a state] may classify . . . for one
purpose . . . , it may, according to my contention, classify . . . for other.”419 Davis
trusted his audience to extrapolate: if a state may not classify on the basis of these
traits, classrooms would become sites of unregulated mixing, including among
“normal” children and those children that states had identified as subnormal or
lesser in their mental functioning. Davis’s argument did not prevail in Brown,
but he was a famously savvy legal advocate; the rhetoric itself is telling.420
Or consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center (1985), involving a plan to build a group home for people with
intellectual disabilities and a municipal zoning ordinance that required a special
use permit for such a project.421 Applying that ordinance, the City Council of
Cleburne, Texas, had voted to deny the permit in this case.422 The Supreme Court
struck down this application of the ordinance as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.423 The decision was in some sense a victory for people with
417. Transcript of Oral Argument, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (available at
https://www.lib.umich.edu/brown-versus-board-education/oral/Marshall&Davis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82U8-QKEF]). This example comes from Tom Gilhool, who mentioned it in
interviews. I acknowledge that the Davis quote contains terms that today might be considered offensive,
depending on the audience and the context. I include them here because to paraphrase would sanitize
the quote and thereby prevent readers from seeing the racial calamity that Davis was attempting to
invoke.
418. See id.
419. Id.
420. As Davis surely knew, his argument about “mental capacity” found support in the Supreme
Court decision Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (suggesting the constitutional validity of separating
out and sterilizing individuals with intellectual disabilities); cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973) (“[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”). On Davis’s career, influence, and reputation,
see Sydnor Thompson, John W. Davis and His Role in the Public School Segregation Cases—A Memoir,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679 (1996); WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF
JOHN W. DAVIS (1973).
421. 473 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1985).
422. Id. at 437.
423. Id. at 450.
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disabilities, especially people seeking noninstitutional placements in the
community.424 But the Court also explicitly rejected the notion that state or local
laws singling out people with intellectual or developmental disabilities merited
a higher-than-ordinary level of scrutiny, and in doing so, made sweeping
statements about the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.425
The gist of these statements—packaged within an ostensible victory for
Cleburne’s intellectually disabled residents—was that if the Court were to
liberalize its equal protection jurisprudence in this case, everything would
become unsettled.426 The Court instead chose to characterize the existing tiers of
scrutiny as firmly fixed; to make clear that a group’s political marginalization
was not, in and of itself, a sound reason for requesting a harder look from the
courts; and to urge that both federalism and separation of powers counseled
judicial restraint in this area.427
The implications of these jurisprudential choices extended well beyond the
Cleburne litigants. Indeed, as Professor William Araiza has shown, it was certain
Justices’ desire to make these more general pronouncements that really drove the
opinion.428 Most obviously, Cleburne’s approach to the Equal Protection Clause
affected whether other groups could claim a more exacting level of scrutiny from
the courts in future cases. When combined with the Court’s restrictive Section
Five jurisprudence, the Court’s statements in Cleburne also limited what
Congress could do to remedy perceived discrimination. After all, if there were
no constitutional violations to remedy, the Fourteenth Amendment gave
Congress no authority to act.429

424. Id.
425. Id. at 442. For useful summaries and critiques of the Court’s equal protection holding, see
Anita Silvers & Michael Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the
Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 81, 84 (2001) (describing how the Supreme Court’s “retrogressive” approach to disability in
Cleburne imposed “a disability classification that presupposes incompetence”); Michael Waterstone,
Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 541 (2014) (arguing that the Cleburne Court’s
analysis “created and perpetuated a harmful constitutional ‘otherness’ to the disability classification”).
In University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court would transform Cleburne’s holding as to individuals
with intellectual or developmental disabilities into a more general holding as to “the disabled.” 531 U.S.
356, 360–74 (2001); Waterstone, supra, at 543.
426. On the openness of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in the years leading up to
Cleburne, see Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (2014).
427. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. As it turned out, Cleburne’s stringent application of rational basis
review would undermine the majority’s efforts to halt the liberalization of the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. With the distance of time, it is clear that it built support for “what scholars now call the
‘animus’ doctrine.” William D. Araiza, Was Cleburne an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 621, 627
(2017). This result appears to have been purely “accident[al].” Id.
428. Araiza, supra note 427, at 623–26.
429. Waterstone, supra note 425, at 543–46; see also Pamela Brandwein, Constitutional
Doctrine as Paring Tool: The Struggle for “Relevant” Evidence in University of Alabama v. Garrett,
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37 (2001) (explaining how this dynamic played out in University of Alabama
v. Garrett).
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Intellectual and developmental disability has also figured in
underappreciated ways in cases involving affirmative rights to state or local
government action. Consider the child at the heart of DeShaney v. Winnebago
County (1989). Owing to a series of traumatic injuries inflicted by his father
while four-year-old Joshua was formally under the protection of the county
Department of Social Services, Joshua “suffered permanent brain damage and
was rendered profoundly retarded.”430 According to the Supreme Court’s
recounting of the facts, Joshua was “expected to spend the rest of his life
confined to an institution.”431 The Court went on, famously, to articulate the
limits of the government’s affirmative obligation under the Constitution’s Due
Process Clauses: these Clauses “generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid,” according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, “even where such aid
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual.”432 Were it otherwise,
Rehnquist continued, every case like this, that inspired “natural sympathy” in
lawyers and judges, might become the foundation for constitutional litigation.433
This severely disabled child—“Poor Joshua,” as Justice Blackman memorialized
him in dissent434—represented the slippery slope beneath the Justices’ feet.
From DeShaney, commentators have extracted a much broader idea: that
the Constitution, as a whole, is a “charter of negative liberties”; it tells states only
what they may not do, not what they must or should do, to ensure citizens’ wellbeing.435 Even when a state statute guarantees a citizen a certain minimal level
of state protection, and state officers tragically fail in their duties, the U.S.
Constitution may well have nothing to offer the aggrieved citizen.
Indeed, citing DeShaney, the Court held as much in the domestic abuse case
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.436 Jessica Gonzales had sued the Town of
Castle Rock after the police department failed to enforce a domestic abuse
restraining order against her estranged husband, leading ultimately to the death
of her three children.437 Gonzales characterized the lack of enforcement as a
deprivation of a property interest, one that was recognized by state statute and
430. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189 (1989). I include the
word “retarded” because I think it mattered to the Court and because I think that a less offensive phrase
may not capture the clinical judgment underlying the term (as used here). At the time of the litigation,
experts still used the word “retarded” and its modifiers to describe the nature and degree of an
individual’s intellectual or developmental impairment. I acknowledge the current offensiveness of the
term and do not wish to perpetuate its use. Likewise, I include the ableist trope of “suffering” because I
think this wording illuminates how some Justices understood the experience of disability.
431. Id. at 193.
432. Id. at 196.
433. Id. at 202–03.
434. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
435. See generally Lynda G. Dodd, DeShaney v. Winnebago County: Governmental Neglect
and the “Blessings of Liberty,” in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 185–210 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L.
Goluboff eds., 2008).
436. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
437. Id. at 751–54.
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therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.438 The
Supreme Court disagreed, overruling a Tenth Circuit decision in Gonzales’s
favor.439 It was a striking abandonment of vulnerable citizens to the whims (good
or bad) of state and local officials.440 The concededly “horrible facts” of the
case—as “undeniably tragic” as those in DeShaney441—only made the principle
seem more secure against future challenge. If “Poor Joshua” and poor Jessica
had no affirmative rights under the Constitution, no one did.
Again, it would be possible for courts to reach these legal conclusions in a
different context, completely unrelated to intellectual or developmental
disability. What these examples suggest, however, is that ideas about certain
disabilities and the difficulty of preventing or accommodating them may have
eased the path—the path toward a vision of government that accepts powerful
central-state intervention in some arenas but circumscribes the federal
government’s ability to assure inclusion and protection in others.442 Neatly
reversing the presumptions of the Reconstruction Amendments, those promises
now often depend on states and their subsidiaries, for better or for worse.
CONCLUSION
One of Pennhurst’s most prominent survivors is Roland Johnson. Before
his death in 1994, Johnson became a well-known voice in the self-advocacy
movement and also published a short memoir. A theme of that memoir is his
repeated efforts to understand his time at Pennhurst—how he ended up there,
438. Id. at 754–55.
439. Id. at 768–69.
440. Id. at 768 (rejecting the plaintiff’s constitutional due process claim but noting that the people
of her state were free to create an appropriate state law remedy for the rights violation she alleged).
441. Id. at 751, 755.
442. Another example, of less relevance to the Article’s federalism theme and involving a
different type of disability, is Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which stemmed from the
termination of George Eldridge’s disability benefits. The decision famously reined in the Supreme
Court’s due process jurisprudence, narrowing the possibilities that Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) had opened up. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. In articulating and justifying the balancing
approach that it would apply going forward, the Eldridge Court repeatedly emphasized how the
disability benefits that Eldridge received were different from the need-based income support benefits at
issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, and in doing so drew on tropes about disabled people. Id. at 333–49. Writing
for the majority, Justice Powell noted the “significant” “hardship” that loss of benefits might cause to
someone in Eldridge’s position, who was physically unable to accrue income through work, but then
simply assumed that such a person was unlikely to experience dire need. Id. Other social safety net
programs would pick up the slack, Justice Powell suggested (with apparently no understanding of how
difficult it is to enroll in public benefits programs). Id. at 342. Similarly, in assessing the public interest
in the level of process accorded to claimants like Eldridge, Powell seemed to assume a vast number of
ineligible recipients on the disability rolls, each of whom would exploit any pre-termination procedures
accorded to them. Id. at 347. The specter of disability fraud thus helped justify a due process
jurisprudence that applied well beyond disability benefits. On the idea of disability fraud or fakery and
its cultural and legal significance, see SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC
108–37 (2009); ELLEN SAMUELS, FANTASIES OF IDENTIFICATION: DISABILITY, GENDER, RACE (2014);
Doron Dorfman, The Fear of Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights Discourse, 53
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1051 (2019).
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what it all meant. “It took me a long while to think why I was sent there, why I
was put there at Pennhurst.”443 “I wonder why I went to Pennhurst, but things
came to me while I went to Pennhurst.”444 “Pennhurst didn’t meant nothing to
me. Pennhurst was me with sorrows and grief.”445 “I went back and talked to
people when the closing of the Pennhurst. But I didn’t go back there to talk when
people was still there. . . .”446 At one point Johnson simply concluded that
“they”—whoever the deciders were—“had nowhere else to put me, so I had to
go there.”447
Just as Johnson’s memories of Pennhurst evade easy analysis, so does the
Pennhurst litigation. From the years I have spent researching and discussing this
Article, however, one comment stands out: in an offhand way, a fellow law
professor remarked that they just didn’t see Pennhurst as “a disability case.” One
reason this comment was striking is that it fundamentally contradicts how people
outside of legal academia think about the Pennhurst litigation. To those who
have a scholarly or personal interest in disability history, or a personal
connection to an institution like Pennhurst, disability is central to the Pennhurst
litigation (and, surprisingly, the Supreme Court is not).448 But another reason this
comment stuck with me is that it raises fundamental questions about this project
and my own aspirations: What does it mean to be “a disability case”? Do I want
Pennhurst to be understood as such? Is that all?
To recategorize or relabel can be a powerful move, but my aspirations for
Pennhurst are bolder. As scholars continue to think through the relationship
between federalism, inter-branch dynamics, and the elusive promise of equality,
I hope that the concepts of ability and disability infuse that work—alongside
such better-recognized concepts as race, gender, sexuality, national origin, and
economic status. Scholars are relatively adept at noticing how these markers and
experiences of difference matter to law’s subjects—how people draw on them to
make sense of their own lives and the people around them. And we are getting
better at recognizing how these axes of difference matter to law, including to
areas of law that do not explicitly concern them. But too often, disability still
remains outside the frame. It is a problem for specific bodies of law to “deal
with,” rather than a concept, like gender or race, that can itself do important legal
work.449

443. Johnson, supra note 83, at 9.
444. Id. at 11.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 15.
447. Id. at 9.
448. See, e.g., 3 Pennsylvania Court Cases That Changed the World, PENNHURST MEM’L &
PRES. ALL., http://www.preservepennhurst.org/default.aspx?pg=1649 [https://perma.cc/GV3Z-EXQX]
(describing the Pennhurst case as world changing but mentioning only the 1977 district court opinion).
449. Scholars cited throughout this piece are working to change this. My concluding thoughts
build on their important work.
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Ultimately, Pennhurst is a “disability case,” and it is also a testimony to the
power of ideas about disability to shape our legal world.

